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Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the
Sanctuary, and the Body
Linda C. McClain*

This article explores the idea and imagery of inviolability. I use a
trilogy of terms-the castle, the sanctuary, and the body-to
illuminate different loci of inviolability and to show how notions of
sacredness and sanctity undergird the legal protection of inviolability.
These images, familiar from privacy jurisprudence, provide a useful
lens through which to examine the association between inviolability
and gender. Familiar feminist critiques suggest that concepts such as
privacy have served to deny, rather than to secure, inviolability for
women and women's bodies. I explore the interplay of inviolability
and privacy in some prominent feminist accounts of sexuality, and I
use the trilogy of castle, sanctuary, and body to offer some thoughts
about envisioning inviolability for women, particularity in the contexts
of bodily integrity and personal autonomy.
In Part I, I discuss the idea of inviolability and its relationship to
privacy. The body, including physical, intellectual, and spiritual
aspects of the person and personality, is a familiar location of the
law's protection of inviolability. Equally familiar is the locus of the
home, or "castle." I develop the image of the sanctuary or temple
(although references to "temple" are not common in the
jurisprudence of inviolability and privacy, references to "sanctuary"
abound). The term sanctuary has a clearly religious root as well as
more general associations with refuge and restricted access. Within
the image of the sanctuary, I include the generalized meaning of
sanctuary and highlight the association of inviolability with sacredness
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(particularly the sacredness of the body), immunity, and inaccessibility. To be sure, the principle of inviolability, as translated into
law, is not given absolute protection, but privacy does protect or hold
inviolate a realm that is a sanctuary and a refuge from the reach of
the state and other persons.1
I suggest that the ideas of controlling access and of being secure
against invasion and violation unify the trilogy of castle, sanctuary,
and body. Women's abilities to control access to their bodies and to
be free from violation animate feminist reform efforts in law and
society and are at the center of many contemporary debates about
how best to secure women's sexual autonomy, to achieve reproductive
autonomy for women, and to eliminate violence against women.
Indeed, as I discuss in Part II, prominent accounts of feminist
jurisprudence charge that to be a woman under current social
conditions is, by definition, to lack inviolability. On this view, which
I shall call the "illusion critique," the legal protection of inviolability,
celebrated under the rubric of a right of privacy, yields a "sphere of
sanctified isolation" that benefits men at the expense of women.2
Yet, while a commitment to naming and to taking seriously the
harms and injuries that women experience is an important component
of feminist work,3 such a commitment should lead not to a rejection
of the value of inviolability, but instead to a call for closing the gap
between the ideal of inviolability and the reality of women's lives
under patriarchy. In Part II, I suggest that considering the interplay
of loci of inviolability in the history of the legal protection of privacy,
and how the legal protection of one form of inviolability may conflict
with or yield to the protection of another, usefully illuminates the
undeniable limitations of such protection for women and suggests the
potential for more adequate protection. Feminist work has exposed
those undeniable, unjust, and deeply disturbing limitations but tends
to discount the role that the ideals of inviolability and privacy have
played and may play in criticizing such limitations as violative of

1. A temple historically afforded immunity, refuge, or sanctuary from the normal operations
of the law. For example, a fugitive from the law or legal authorities could take refuge in a
temple.
2. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281,
1311 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections]; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 656-57 (1983)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence].
3.

See, e.g., BEVERLY BALOS & MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST

WOMEN (1994). Feminists have observed that one risk of the descriptive project of naming
harms is that defining women by what is done to them fails to recognize and value what women
do and their acts of agency, creativity, and struggle, as well as their exercises of privilege. See
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990);
Martha Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practiceand Theory, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217
(1993).
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women's bodily integrity and decisional autonomy, even at the
expense of the supposed "sanctity" of other loci of inviolability (e.g.,
the marital relationship or the home).4
In Part III, I look more closely at inviolability and gender in the
context of women's bodies and sexuality. I begin with a critical
analysis of prominent feminist accounts charging that women in
contemporary society are defined by reference to their potential for
violation and that sexuality is the central site of such violation. I
examine assumptions underlying the relationship among inviolability,
bodily integrity, privacy, and intercourse in such accounts, and I ask
about the roles these critiques assign to the "natural" physical
condition of women's bodies as contrasted with the social construction
of "woman." Images of body as castle and as sanctuary shed light on
these critiques and also capture in part the injury to bodily integrity,
personal autonomy, and privacy caused by sexual assault. Finally, I
suggest that the images of castle and sanctuary (or temple) may have
constructive potential for a feminist account of inviolability. Here I
elaborate upon the. meanings of those images in privacy jurisprudence
suggested in Parts I and II and draw upon scholarship in the area of
religion, particularly feminist work on spirituality. I conclude that an
elaboration of the imagery of body as castle or temple may make a
significant contribution toward developing a vocabulary that can speak
of freedom from violation as well as freedom to pursue intimate
associations.
I.

THE IDEA AND IMAGERY OF INVIOLABILITY

At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest
infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes
committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will
be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human
being.
Simone
Weil5

4. For example, a popular maxim for a number of feminist legal theorists is Audre Lorde's
warning that "[t]he master's tools will never dismantle the master's house." AUDRE LORDE,
The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 112 (1984).
But see ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 180-81

(1988) (concluding that feminist critiques of privacy usefully highlight challenge of "getting rid
of unwanted forms of privacy" but sweep too broadly when they appear to reject privacy itself
and legal rights to privacy). Elsewhere I have defended the importance of privacy in justifying
reproductive rights against feminist criticisms that privacy is too atomistic. See Linda C.
McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection,and FeministJurisprudence,65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992) [hereinafter McClain, "Atomistic Man"]; Linda C. McClain, The
Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J.GENDER & L. 119 (1992) [hereinafter McClain, Privacy].
5. SIMONE WELL, Human Personality, in SIMONE WELL: AN ANTHOLOGY 71 (Sian Miles

ed., 1986).
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A.

Inviolability, Sacredness,and Security
What is inviolability? Common definitions of the quality of being
"inviolable" are "not to be violated," "to be kept sacredly free from
profanation, infraction, or assault,"6 and "impregnable to assault or
trespass.",7 Such definitions suggest both an association with sacredness and an association with security against violation or other
incursions. What is the relationship between these two aspects of
inviolability?
Linking inviolability with sacredness may suggest a religious connotation, yet often the usage of the term indicates that the association
is not explicitly religious. As a definitional matter, the "sacred" has
both an explicit association with religious notions of dedication,
consecration, and veneration, and connotations of that which is highly
valued and important; is worthy of reverence and respect; or, indeed,
is inviolable and unassailable.8 Thus, in the language of law, one
finds strong claims that certain fundamental texts, principles, or rights
ought to be "kept sacred" or held inviolate.9 Some rights are said to
be "unalienable" or natural endowments by the Creator, suggesting
a divine origin. 0 The broader point in invoking sacredness, as well
as inviolability, often seems to be to convey the idea that something
merits reverence and should not be violated, infringed, or even
altered."
(Of course, the synonymous usage of sacredness and
inviolability may be circular and tautological and thus may not reveal
exactly what it is about something that makes it either sacred or

6. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 51 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. Further
meanings include "[t]hat cannot be violated; that does not yield to force or violence; incapable
of being broken, forced, or injured." Id.
7.

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (3d ed. 1992)

[hereinafter AMERICAN HERITAGE] (including among definitions of "inviolability": "safe from
or secured against violation or profanation").
8. 14 OED, supra note 6, at 339 (including among definitions of "sacred": "secured by
religious sentiment, reverence, sense or justice, or the like, against violation, infringement, or
encroachment").
9. See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 173 n.3 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'the
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by
a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate' (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a))); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (stating that Fourth and Fifth Amendments secure
"sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" and protect against "invasion of [a man's]
indefeasible [and "sacred"] right of personal security, personal liberty and private property");
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.) ("The fundamental maxims of
free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should
be held sacred."); Gatewood v. Matthews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) ("'We
Declare that everything in this Bill of Rights is excepted out of the general powers of
government, and shall forever remain inviolate."' (quoting KY. CONST. § 26)); Johnson v. Duke,
24 A.2d 304, 308 (Md. 1942) ("It is the sacred duty of the Courts to preserve inviolate the
integrity of the Constitution.").
10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
11. See supra notes 7-9: see also 14 OED, supra note 6, at 339.
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inviolable.) For instance, Ronald Dworkin envisions a close, even
synonymous, relationship between sacredness and inviolability in his
explication of a shared intrinsic value of the "sanctity" of life. 2 He
further suggests that, for some persons, sanctity stems from the idea
of a divine creator and the idea of humanity as reflecting the image
of God, while for others sanctity is a more secular reverence for
nature and the creative process of life. 3
The common association of inviolability with sacredness or sanctity,
along with security, is also evident in the frequent observation that
the most basic duty of a government is to protect citizens' rights to
life and to the physical security of their persons. 4 Thomas Nagel
suggests that the value of inviolability for human beings is in having
the moral status that one "may not be violated in certain ways-such
treatment is inadmissible, and if it occurs, the person has been
wronged."' 5 The epigraph from Simone Weil similarly links what is
sacred in human beings to the conviction that evil will not be done to
them, even in the face of injury. Here it is useful to distinguish
between a state of actually being safe against violation and an
expectation that one may not, or should not, be violated (backed up,
for example, by ethical conviction, social consensus, and law) as being
two distinct meanings of inviolability. Along the lines of the second
meaning, legal discourse continually uses the vocabulary of invasion
and violation to describe harms to persons and their rights to
property, privacy, and the like, and to demand redress.
The association of inviolability with sacredness and security appears
in the law's protection of inviolability in many areas, particularly
under the rubric of a right to privacy or a more general "right to be

12. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 25, 68-101 (1993) (analyzing abortion and
euthanasia).
13. Id. at 75-84; see Genesis 1:27 ("So God created man in his own image, in the image of
God he created him; male and female he created them.").
14. This is a frequent theme in statements about crime made by politicians. See, e.g.,
President William Clinton, Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony of FBI Director Louis Freeh
(Sept. 1, 1993) (transcript available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, FNS file) ("You, the American
people, have a right to freedom from fear. Your families have a right to security and to
safety."). Courts, however, have rejected claims based on a failure to protect on the basis that
duties to protect are owed to the public at large, not to particular individuals, and that the
federal Constitution confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, absent a special
relationship. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989); Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983). For a critique of such precedents, see
Steven J. Heymann, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991).
15. Thomas Nagel, The Value of Inviolability 11-12 (September 1, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with N.Y.U. Colloquium for the Study of Law, Philosophy, and Social
Theory) (English version of La Valeur de l'inviolabilite,1994 Revue de Metaphysiqu6 et de
Morale 149-66); see also THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 143 (1991).
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let alone."' 6 Considerable disagreement exists among privacy
theorists over exactly what the core of the right of privacy is, whether
such a core holds together its tort law 7 and constitutional law18
manifestations, and what falls inside and outside of it. 9 A number
of commentators argue that inaccessibility, or restricted access, and
the values of solitude, secrecy, and anonymity, form the core of
privacy.2° Other privacy theorists maintain, particularly with respect
to constitutional privacy rights, that the core is moral personhood and
sovereignty in making important intimate decisions;21 here, inviolability is a principle of moral autonomy and freedom from
governmental interference. Still other privacy theorists attempt to
meld access and personhood rationales by linking the tort and

16. For classic articulations of the "right to be let alone," see Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the "makers of our Constitution...
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men"); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis.
The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195,213 (1890) (arguing that right to privacy is part
of a broader right of the individual, held against the world, "to be let alone") (citing THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (Chicago, Callahan & Co., 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter COOLEY ON
TORTS]). A perhaps less familiar but also influential opinion is Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (describing "sacred" common law right to possession and
control of one's person as "right of complete immunity: to be let alone" (quoting COOLEY ON
TORTS 29)).
17. The privacy rights protected by tort law limit access to individuals. Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,437-43 (1980). Prosser's often-noted definition
of privacy in tort law distinguishes four distinct torts: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
18. Constitutional privacy rights involve protection against governmental interference and
include spatial and informational privacy (for example, Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection
against unlawful intrusions into the home or into the person for purposes of law enforcement
or protection and against self-incrimination), as well as decisional privacy (pursuant to
Fourteenth Amendment liberty and "penumbral" privacy, protection against unwarranted
interference with decision making concerning important areas of life). See generally LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to -21 (2d ed. 1988).
19. For helpful summaries of the literature on privacy rights, see Gavison, supra note 17;
ALLEN, supra note 4; JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION (1991); cf Gary L.
Bostwick, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV.
1447 (1976) (subdividing privacy into three components: privacy of repose, privacy of sanctuary,
and privacy of intimate decision).
20. Gavison, supra note 17, at 428 (identifying values of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude);
see also ALLEN, supra note 4, at 15 (advocating "restricted-access" definition). Gavison argues
that the "decisional" privacy associated with the constitutional right of privacy is not, properly
speaking, within the scope of "privacy" at all, but instead implicates liberty of action. Gavison,
supra note 17, at 438-39; cf. TRIBE, supra note 18, § 15-10 at 1352 (arguing that "privacy" is
misnomer for right of individual autonomy, or personal liberty, with respect to decision making).
21. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 15-1 to -3 (discussing attempts to ground constitutional
privacy rights in personhood); Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 26, 37 (1976) (arguing that "right to privacy is fundamentally connected to personhood"); see also James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV.
211,287-89,292-95 (1993) (advancing idea of deliberative autonomy as deriving from conception
of the person).
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constitutional dimensions of the right of privacy to a core idea of
intimacy and individual control over intimate access. 22 For present
purposes I will not attempt to resolve these debates, but I will suggest
that some notion of inviolability, or a realm within which one is free
2
from interference or invasion, links the different forms of privacy
and constitutes a prominent normative basis for rights of privacy. My
argument is not that privacy and inviolability are synonymous, nor
that privacy jurisprudence exhausts the locations of inviolability in the
law, but that expectations of inviolability undergird claims of privacy
and that legal protection of privacy in turn fosters such expectations.
B. The Loci of Inviolability in Privacy Jurisprudence
The trilogy of body, sanctuary, and castle illuminates the relationOne finds
ship among inviolability, sacredness, and security.
references across a number of substantive areas of law, especially in
privacy jurisprudence, in support of rights to bodily integrity and
decisional autonomy, to the "sacred" right to control one's person,
and to the sanctity and the "inviolability of the person" or the
The notion of
body,24 as well as to the "inviolate personality."'

22. INNESS, supra note 19, at 116-34; see also ALLEN, supra note 4, at 33, 52 (responding to
Gavison by arguing that decisional privacy should be component of privacy and that it furthers
goals of inaccessibility).
23. For the Supreme Court's stated adherence to the line of precedents associated with the
constitutional right of privacy and its interpretation of those cases as involving bodily integrity
and decisional autonomy, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) ("It is
a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter."). With respect to women's decisions concerning abortion, I have argued elsewhere
that the Casey joint opinion's omission of explicit language of privacy in describing that
realm-in contrast to precedents partially overruled in Casey-accompanies its rejection of a
right to be "insulated" from others and its recognition of permissible state efforts to persuade
pregnant women to continue their pregnancies. See McClain, Privacy, supra note 4,at 128-33.
See also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstet. & Gyn.. 476 U.S. 747. 766 (1986)
(characterizing a woman's "decision to terminate a pregnancy" as "intensely private," which
"'may be exercised without public scrutiny' (citation omitted)), overruled in part by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
language
24. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891). Botsford and its
of sacredness and inviolability have been featured in Supreme Court and other judicial
recognitions of protection against both invasions of bodily integrity and interference with
decisional autonomy. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Botsford); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269
(1990) (quoting from Botsford in support of notion of bodily integrity and requirement of
informed consent for medical treatment); id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (citing
Botsford in support of argument that "our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our
idea of physical freedom and self-determination"); id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Botsford on "sacred" common law right of inviolability of person); id. at 342 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Botsford for common law tradition underlying constitutional right to bodily
integrity); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 214 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Botsford);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing Botsford); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1967)
(searching clothing is serious intrusion on sanctity of person and may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment; quoting Botsford in support of personal security and privacy interest
protected by Fourth Amendment); Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(citing Botsford and upholding right to seek acupuncture as medical treatment). For cases
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belonging to oneself, or of a right to one's person, is a familiar
expression of the normative foundation of privacy.26 For some, it is
precisely the sacredness of the body that requires rejecting notions of
self-ownership or of a property right in one's person, because they
"commingle the sacred with the profane" by equating the body with
"the basest commercial commodity"; for others, protecting self-determination in the use of one's body protects and preserves sanctity.27
Another locus of sanctity and inviolability is the home, reflecting
the common law idea of a man's home as his "castle" or fortress,
where he is free from arbitrary intrusion by government or others.'
Indeed, jurists often use this maxim to explain the historical and
political milestone of the Fourth Amendment, stressing the need for
the "inviolability of the inside" against invasion from outside and
deploying the language of "shelter," "enclave," "insulated enclosure,"
"inviolate place," and "oasis" to characterize that space.2 9 The home
as castle appears in defenses of privacy rights sounding in tort law and

invoking sanctity, although not citing Botsford, see Winston v. Lee. 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
25. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 205. The inviolability of the personality, as well
as Justice Brandeis's dissenting invocation in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
of the "right to be let alone" and its relation to man's "spiritual nature," have been enlisted in
many subsequent Supreme Court and other judicial opinions (at times in dissent) in defense of
a constitutional right of privacy, not only of the home ("spatial" privacy) and "informational"
privacy, but also "decisional" privacy (freedom to make important personal decisions). See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 478; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Stanley v. Georgia. 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); see generally
TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 15-1 to -21.
26. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 777 & n.5, overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("concept of privacy embodies the 'moral
fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole') (citing Charles
Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288-89 (1977)); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) ("Every Man has a Property in his own
Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.").
27. Compare Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian,
J., concurring) (rejecting conversion claim for removal of cells and use in research and
commercially valuable products without informing patient of intent or commercial value) with
id. at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that "profound ethical imperative to respect the human
body as the physical and temporal expression of the unique human persona" and sanctity and
dignity of person should permit plaintiff to control commercial exploitation of his body). The
relationship between inviolability and inalienability, with respect to the commodification of the
body, is outside the scope of this Article, except to note that notions of sacredness and sanctity,
as Moore suggests, may play a role in the debate. See generally Margaret Radin, Market
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). For a recent critique of Radin's theory of
property, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin's Imagery of Personal
Property as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994).
28. See Gavison, supra note 17, at 464 & n.131 (discussing history of home as sphere of
privacy).
29. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 316 & n.19 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting).
affd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591-98 & n.44 (1980)
(observing that "zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a 'man's house is his castle,'
made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies 'the freedom of one's house'
was one of the most vital elements of English liberty"); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 847
(2d Cir. 1990) (noting deep American belief in home as "inviolate castle and keep").
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in constitutional law, with a common theme of restricting access and
keeping others out. 30
The rhetoric of the inviolability and privacy of the home repeatedly
employs images of sanctuary.31 A sanctuary, of course, may mean
a temple or the most sacred part of a religious space, the dwelling
place of the presence of God, but it may also connote any place of
refuge and protection.32 This language of sanctuary signals that the
home is a refuge for persons and their intimate relationships against
invasion and intrusion, either by government or by others.
Elaborations of constitutional protection for the privacy of the home
stress that the "sacredness" or "sanctity" of the home attends not
simply (or even primarily) because of the "sanctity" of property
rights, but because of the privacy expectations of persons within the
home-"the privacies of life, 33 and the "pre-eminence" of the home
"as the seat of family life."'

There is a strong theme of a proper

realm of inaccessibility or secrecy with respect to the world at large,
as well as a recognition of the important social dimension of such
protected inner space (the intimate relationships and activities
therein).35 Of course, intimacy itself strongly connotes privacy,
which in turn may be viewed as a precondition or a "necessary shield"
for intimacy.36
Images of body, castle, and sanctuary are not mutually exclusive.

For example, both castle and sanctuary connote a notion of refuge
and haven. Judicial opinions reveal a cluster of spatial images

30. One dimension of the idea of the home as castle is the right of a man or woman to
protect the home and persons within it against intrusion or attack by using force. See State v.
Hamric, 151 S.E.2d 252, 270-71 (W. Va. 1966) (Browning, J., dissenting) (discussing numerous
authorities). A disturbing recent example of the misapplication of such a right involved an
acquittal of a homeowner for fatally shooting a Japanese exchange student who mistakenly
approached the home looking for a party. Peter Pringle, Verdict on Baton Rouge Killing Shocks
Japanese.INDEPENDENT, May 25, 1993, at 10 (reporting defense lawyer's statement in court that

"Americans have the absolute legal right to answer everyone who comes to their door with a
gun"). In a subsequent civil trial brought by the student's parents, however, a judge found "no
justification whatsoever" for the killing and awarded damages. Adam Nossiter, Judge Awards
Damages In Japanese Youth's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at A12.

31. See Bostwick, supra note 19, at 1448, 1456 (including privacy of sanctuary in taxonomy
of privacy).
32. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1040 (1987); Exodus 25:8 ("And
let them make me a sanctuary, that I may dwell in their midst."). For discussion of the image
of the temple in connection with women's bodies, see infra Part III.
33. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life").
34. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (explaining sacredness of home as based on privacy
interests of persons within home).
35. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 15-1, 15-21 (suggesting that taxonomies of privacy stress
such inward-looking connotations of privacy as sanctuary and arguing that important social
dimension exists, including sexual autonomy).
36.

See Gavison, supra note 17, at 447; see also INNESS, supra note 19, at 74-92.
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evocative of both images: the home as "sanctuary, 3 7 "sacred
retreat,

3

"enclave,"3 9 and "the last citadel of the tired, the weary,

and the sick."' Such formulations suggest a clear link between the
inviolability of places and the sanctity of persons and activities within
them." The multiple loci of inviolability are manifest in the most
famous explication of the constitutional right of privacy, Griswold v.
42
Connecticut.
Justice Douglas's exposition of the penumbras of

privacy touched upon the "'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life"' protected by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments, the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms," and the
marital relationship itself as "intimate to the degree of being sacred,"

protected by a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights. 3
The vocabulary of inviolability also uses spatial imagery of the
castle or the sanctuary to convey the appropriate inaccessibility of the
person, the "inviolable citadel" of a person's heart and mind," or the
"inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought."45

Indeed, Joel

Feinberg suggests that philosophers use the term "personal
autonomy" to label "the realm of inviolable sanctuary most of us

sense in our own beings."'

These images of inner, inviolable space

are striking. They raise questions about the relationship between
personhood and body, which are relevant to the constructive feminist

37. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 1984), affd, 476 U.S. 227
(1986) ("The home is fundamentally a sanctuary, where personal concepts of self and family are
forged, where relationships are nurtured and where people normally feel free to express
themselves in intimate ways"; distinguishing privacy expectations at home from those at
industrial plant).
38. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
39. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 316 & n.19 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting),
affld, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
40. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111,
125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).
41. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 ("Our prior decisions... have recognized that '[p]reserving
the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from
the tribulation of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value."' (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980))).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 484, 485-86 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas's imagery may evoke the Biblical
passage (often included in marriage liturgies) that a man "cleaves to his wife and they become
one flesh." Genesis 2:24. Elsewhere in this volume, Professor Garet explores the theme of the
sacred marriage in Griswold from a gnostic perspective. Ronald R. Garet, Gnostic Due Process,
7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97 (1995).
44. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (stating that "it is not within
the power of government to invade" the "inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind"
through which religion occupies exalted place in society); cf. John Christman, Introduction, in
THE INNER CITADEL 3 (John Christman ed., 1989) (suggesting that metaphor of "inner citadel"
suggestively captures concept of autonomy) (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF
LIBERTY (1958)).
45. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining
roots of Fifth Amendment privilege).
46. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note 44, at 27.
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task of envisioning inviolability for women.47 Finally, the image of
the body as a temple, sanctified and created in the image of God, is
familiar from certain religious texts and traditions' and is reflected

in people's everyday self-descriptions.49

At times such images

accompany legal appeals for protection of the inviolability of the
body." In Part III, I elaborate upon the potential of the images of

castle and sanctuary for a feminist account of inviolability.
C. Inviolability and Immunity

In considering the translation of the principle of inviolability into
law, it is important to comment upon the relationship between
inviolability and immunity. As images such as sanctuary and refuge
suggest, to the extent that privacy rights protect individuals against

governmental interference, they afford immunity. That immunity may
consist of an expectation of physical security and inaccessibility as well
as the freedom to decide and to act in a manner contrary to the

convictions of certain majorities. Rights have social costs, thus the
justification for rights generally includes some conviction that society's
bearing those costs is preferable to a political regime less protective

of human freedom and moral autonomy.5

47. For example, do we dwell in our bodies or are we our bodies? How does sexual assault
injure a woman's body and her personhood? See infra Part III.
48. 1 Corinthians6:19-20 is an example: "Do you not know that your body is a temple of
the Holy Spirit within you, which you have from God? You are not your own; you were bought
with a price. So glorify God in your body." Paul was admonishing against using the body for
immorality ("he who joins himself to a prostitute becomes one body with her"). Id. at 6:15-18.
49. Sometimes, people who emphasize taking care of their bodies, particularly those engaged
in athletic activity, speak of their bodies as temples to explain why they abstain from certain
habits such as unhealthy eating, drinking, or smoking.
50. A vivid example linking castle, temple, and body is United States v. Williamson, 15
C.M.R. 320, 335 (1954) (Quinn, J., dissenting), in which the chief judge, dissenting from a ruling
concerning the taking of evidence, stated that if a man's home is his castle, "then these
inalienable rights, which are implicit in the Law of Nature and of Nature's God, demand that
the sanctity of the human body. made in the image and likeness of God-the temple of his
immortal soul-be and remain forever sacred and inviolate." Religious beliefs about the sanctity
of the body often underlie objections to compulsory immunization, blood transfusions, and other
invasive procedures. See Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 653, 655
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs have established likelihood of success on merits of
opposition to immunization based upon religious beliefs forbidding violation of sanctity of body);
Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270,274 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (granting injunctive relief to parents who
asserted that mandatory participation in physical education program in which other children
dressed immodestly threatened their Pentecostal religious belief that body is "temple of the Holy
Spirit" and must be modestly attired to preserve its sanctity); Maier v. Good, 325 F. Supp. 1268,
1270 (N.D.N.Y. 1971) (plaintiff asserting religious exemption to compulsory immunization based
on religious belief that sanctity of human body must not be violated by injection).
51. For a defense of rights along these lines, in the context of certain communitarian
critiques, see Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility,43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994); see also
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (including among
"fundamental values and most noble aspirations" underlying Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination "our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a 'shelter to the guilty,'
is often 'a protection to the innocent') (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162
(1955)).
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At the same time, rhetorical flourishes notwithstanding, rights often
have limits, and the principle of inviolability does not translate into
absolute immunity from the reach of government or of others. It is
accurate to say that rights do afford individuals immunity from the
consequences of the exercise of their rights, but it is a caricature of
the idea of the "right to be let alone" to suggest that it bars all legal
restraint upon an individual (not to mention social suasion or
sanction) or that we are all at liberty to do whatever we want,
For example,
regardless of the consequences for others. 52
constitutional jurisprudence teaches that the privacy of the home
protected by the Fourth Amendment does not afford an "inviolate
sanctuary" from governmental intrusions for the purposes of crime
detection and law enforcement. 3 Similarly, the value of the inviolability of the person undergirding the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination has never been given full scope in the
application of the privilege.' So, too, while notions of privacy, of
inviolability of the person, and of the right to control one's body place
constraints upon government, they do not in operation bar all
invasions of bodily integrity or privacy, whether for law enforcement55 or for furthering other interests of society.56 Moreover,

52. See McClain, supra note 51, at 1038-57 (assessing communitarian claims concerning legal
and moral impact of rights and "absolutist" rights talk). For a defense of the "right to be let
alone" against caricatured understandings of autonomy, see James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,381 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (stating that police may search private homes and that "their power to do so is
unquestioned so long as the search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment"); United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1981) ("threshold of one's
home, however, is not a boundary-like the Yalu River-beyond which a suspect has inviolate
sanctuary").
54. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,762,767 (1966) (upholding blood test for alcohol).
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (holding that compulsion of testimony
from a witness in exchange for immunity from both use and derivative use of that testimony
against the witness does not violate Fifth Amendment privilege); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 439 (1956) (holding that statute providing transactional immunity from prosecution on
basis of compelled testimony does not violate Fifth Amendment because "immunity displaces
the danger" and "once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases"); but see
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that use immunity is insufficient
because Court's prior decisions establish that "transactional immunity" is necessary to afford
immunity coterminous with Fifth Amendment privilege (citing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 586 (1892))); Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 440, 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"right of silence created by the Fifth Amendment is beyond the reach of Congress" and that
"Fifth Amendment protects the conscience and the dignity of the individual, as well as his safety
and security, against the compulsion of government").
55. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding strip search including visual
examination of body cavities of persons held in pretrial detention); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772
(upholding blood test for alcohol); Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957)
(upholding border search of male rectum and stomach); see generallyTRIBE, supra note 18, § 159 (discussing cases upholding and invalidating intrusive procedures).
56. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,439 (1957) (upholding blood test for alcohol
and stating that "against the right of the individual that his person be held inviolable.... must
be set the interests of society" in protecting against "one of the greatest causes of the mortal
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even the fundamental rights of bodily integrity and decisional
autonomy associated with the right of privacy protect persons only
against "unwarranted government intrusion" and may yield to a
compelling state interest 57 or even to a merely substantial state
58
interest, provided the state does not impose "undue burdens.
Precisely how ideas of inviolability should translate into law and
where lines should be drawn in these instances are subjects of
considerable disagreement among jurists, scholars, lawyers, and
citizens.5 9

II.

FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF PRIVACY:
THE ILLUSION OF INVIOLABILITY

One feminist response to the striking images of inviolability
discussed in Part I is to suggest that the inviolability so celebrated in
privacy jurisprudence is an illusion for women, which exists for men
at the expense of women, and that rights of privacy imperil rather
than secure women's inviolability.' ° In this section, I consider this

hazards of the road"). A notorious example involving a woman's bodily integrity is Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 203 (1927), in which the Court per Justice Holmes upheld the involuntary
sterilization of a woman (wrongly) characterized as an "imbecile," analogizing cutting the
fallopian tubes to other appropriate forms of patriotic sacrifice. But see Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating on equal protection grounds statute providing for
sterilization of persons [in that case, a male prisoner] convicted two or more times of "felonies
involving moral turpitude" and describing right to reproduce as "one of the basic civil rights of
man").
57. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
58. The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey placed heavy emphasis upon the word
"unwarranted" in upholding an informed consent scheme, although it never spoke of a
"compelling" state interest, but instead spoke of a "substantial" interest, and adopted an "undue
burden" standard for evaluating state regulation of abortion procedures. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 281921 (1992).
59. Here I do not attempt to offer my own view on all the examples given in the text.
Elsewhere I have addressed some of the questions raised in the text in the context of
communitarian critiques of rights and liberal justifications of them, see McClain, supra note 51,
as well as in the context of liberal, feminist, and communitarian analyses of abortion, see id. at
1077-87; McClain, "Atomistic Man," supra note 4. at 1242-62: McClain, Privacy, supra note 4.

Opponents of legal abortion, for example, would invoke the inviolability of prenatal life as a
decisive value, while defenders of legal abortion would speak of a woman's inviolability, her
bodily integrity, and her decisional autonomy. For an attempt to defend the morality and
legality of abortion in many circumstances through an appeal to a shared value of the sanctity
of life (closely tied to inviolability), see DWORKIN, supra note 12.
60. Another feminist response, what I have elsewhere called the "atomism" critique, might
suggest that such imagery reflects male values of isolation, separation, and freedom from
interference, and might reject such concepts as privacy and the "right to be let alone" as
peculiarly masculine and atomistic. I have challenged the dichotomies used in the atomism
critique and argued for the importance of autonomy. McClain, "Atomistic Man," supra note 4
(discussing, inter alia. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988)).

Here I note that such feminists as Robin West, who advocate a greater place in law and society
for such values as love, care, and responsibility, also espouse the illusion critique discussed in
the text to the extent that they diagnose violence, sexual abuse, and other forms of male
domination as barriers to women's well-being and equal citizenship, thus recognizing the
importance of inviolability for women. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
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argument (which I shall call the illusion critique) and use the trilogy
of castle, sanctuary, and body to assess its persuasiveness and its
limitations.6
A.

The Private as Refuge or "Hellhole"?

[T]he law of privacy [is] the law that keeps out observing
outsiders.

Sometimes it has. The problem is that while the

private has been a refuge for some, it has been a hellhole for
others, often at the same time.

In gendered light, the law's

privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability.

Catharine MacKinnon 62

Domestic violence did not threaten my childhood. Nor did it
intrude into my world until ten years ago, when on an assignment
for a magazine, I saw a man hit his wife. I was unprepared for
his violence. It shattered the belief I had been raised with that
home is a refuge from the chaos of life.
Donna Ferrato63
Critiques of the law's protection of privacy and of the public/private

distinction

have

been

a

significant

component

of feminist

jurisprudence. They target not only the legal treatment of privacy,
but also an array of beliefs and social practices about privacy and the

61. I do not address whether, as some feminists argue, privacy is particularly inapt for
protecting women's inviolability with respect to reproductive issues. On this argument, while
models of atomistic individuals fail to describe a pregnant women's experience, that a pregnant
woman, in the eyes of the law, "cannot be isolated in her privacy" (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
159 (1973)) too easily serves as justification for constraints upon her choice in the name of
protecting prenatal life. A cautionary example is In re A.C., 533 A.2d. 611,615,617 (D.C. 1987),
in which the court invokes interalia, Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891),
in support of rights to bodily integrity and to refuse medical treatment, but concludes that the
trial court did not err "in subordinating A.C.'s right against bodily intrusion to the interests of
the unborn child and the state" and in ordering caesarean section on A.C. to attempt to preserve
life of her twenty-six-week-old fetus, where surgery may have shortened her life by a few days.
A.C. was a woman with terminal cancer who planned to deliver by caesarean section at twentyeight weeks. That decision, however, was vacated and remanded. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235, 1251-52 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (holding that, in light of woman's rights to bodily integrity
and to refuse medical treatment (citing, inter alia,Botsford), "it would be an extraordinary case"
in which a court "might ever be justified in overriding the patient's wishes and authorizing a
major surgical procedure such as a caesarean section," no matter what quality of patient's life
might be). There is an extensive feminist literature critically assessing privacy, but for a recent
critique of abortion law touching on themes of inviolability, see Drucilla Cornell, "Dismembered
Selves and Wandering Wombs," to be published as Chapter 2 of DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE
IMAGINARY DOMAIN: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY, AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT (forthcoming 1995) (Apr. 2, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
62. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1311 (criticizing development of law of
reproductive control as branch of law of privacy).
63. DONNA FERRATO, LIVING WITH THE ENEMY 2 (1991) (introducing her book of
photographs documenting domestic violence).
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private sphere, and the ways in which they construct and constrain
women's lives.64 A significant feminist project has been to question
the lines drawn between the public and the private and to suggest the
important legal, political, and social implications of designating
spheres such as the home or domestic life as private.6 5 Here my
focus is on the charge that the inviolability that privacy allegedly
protects is an illusion for women and that the immunity privacy
affords benefits men and imperils women, their bodily integrity, and
their decisional autonomy.
What does it mean to say, as feminist theorists who advance the
illusion critique do, that women lack inviolability and that privacy
How, exactly, has legal
rights imperil women's inviolability?
protection of the right to be let alone and of privacy contributed to
women's oppression and the law's failure to protect women's
inviolability and privacy? To encapsulate a familiar formulation of
the argument, feminist investigations of the circumstances of women's
lives reveal that the locus of privacy's protection-the supposed haven
and sanctuary of home and the intimacy of persons and relationships
This very
within the home-is central to women's oppression.'
immunity from state interference renders men unaccountable for what
is done in private-rape, battery, and other exploitation 6 7 and
creates "a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability."' Thus, Catharine MacKinnon charges, "This right to privacy
is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time."69

64. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role
of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 151 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). For a helpful
description and evaluation of such critiques, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
65. One could raise a number of concerns along those lines regarding my analysis of the
trilogy of body, castle, and sanctuary-for example, the legacy of separate spheres doctrine and

gender role assumptions underlying the image of home as haven or sanctuary. See ALLEN, supra
note 4, at 67 (arguing for importance of values of sanctuary, seclusion, and refuge of home for
women but noting that for home to be man's haven, women have paid "social cost" of being
cloistered or confined to home with insufficient opportunities for their own privacy). According
to the doctrine of "separate spheres" for women and men, women were regarded as properly
secluded in or confined to the home and the world of the family, a refuge and haven for men
when they returned from the rough and tumble of the world of capitalistic market competition
and politics. See generally Fran Olsen, The Family andthe Market, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499
(1983). But see Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchyin the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20-21 (1993) ("Black women historically experienced work outside the
home as an aspect of racial subordination and the family as a site of solace and resistance to
white oppression."). Legal restrictions, justified in the name of women's special duties and
responsibilities in the home, also limited women's participation in the public world. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (citing as example Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)). For feminist arguments on the continuing
legacy of separate spheres ideology, see Taub & Schneider, supra note 64.
66.
67.

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 193 (1989).
id.

68.
69.

MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1311.
MACKINNON, supra note 66, at 193-94.
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Nor do women possess the goods of privacy, the "inviolable personality, 71 or the "autonomy or control over the intimacies of
personal identity" applauded by privacy theorists:
[W]omen have no privacy to lose or to guarantee. We are not
inviolable. Our sexuality, meaning gender identity, is not only
violable, it is (hence we are) our violation.... To confront the
fact that we have no pnvacy is to confront our private
degradation as the public order.7 1
The illusion critique, as articulated by MacKinnon, Robin West, and
others, includes both a legal and a social attack on privacy. The legal
component of the charge suggests that the right of privacy sanctions
the violation of women by permitting those with power (men) to act
with impunity and unaccountability toward the powerless (women).72
To recall Nagel's account of inviolability, to say that women are not
inviolable suggests that they lack the moral or legal status of persons
who may not be violated in certain ways. 73 Thus, MacKinnon claims
that women's sexuality is defined in such a way that sexual violation
of women is not a legal wrong but instead is viewed as simply what
it means to be a woman. MacKinnon lists marital rape and battery
as examples of the wrongs shielded by privacy, and these examples
are central in many feminist critiques of the problematic history of
legal nonintervention in the private sphere.7 4
The illusion critique also attributes the harm of privacy and the
violative quality of intimacy to the broader patriarchal ideology, which
constructs the social conditions within which the law of privacy
operates. Women lack inviolability in part because men do not
regard them as moral beings and do not respect their boundaries.
Therefore, the most salient problems that privacy both obscures and
exacerbates are women's lack of control over men's sexual access to
their bodies and the effect on women's lives of the threat of male
violence.75 Women's formal constitutional rights to privacy against

70.

MacKimnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 656 (citing Warren &

Brandeis, supra note 16, at 205 (discussing "inviolate personality")).
71. Id. at 656-57. In Part III, I examine assumptions about the female body found in
MacKinnon's equating women's identity with sexual violation.
72. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1311; see also Robin West, Reconstructing
Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441, 455-56, 458-61 (1992) (arguing that constitutional rights of

privacy themselves, or negative liberty, and concomitant governmental noninterference, protect
private sphere within which men oppress and abuse women).
73. See supra text accompanying note 15.
74. See, e.g., Taub & Schneider, supra note 64, at 155-56. See infra text accompanying notes
85-124 for discussion of marital rape exemption.
75. See West, supra note 72, at 453-56. Thus, MacKinnon charges that grounding women's
reproductive freedom in a privacy right wholly obscures the correct point of departure for laws
concerning reproduction: women's lack of control over men's sexual access to their bodies or
of the reproductive uses of their bodies. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1311-13.

McClain

1995]

the state mean little, the argument goes, if what women really need
is protection by the state against men in private. Yet the state does
not alter the distribution of power because it does not intrude into
intimacy, or men's homes and bedrooms, in the name of privacy.76
Because women's inequality with respect to men in the "private"
sphere has not been recognized, "the doctrine of privacy has become
the triumph of the state's abdication of women in the name of
freedom and self-determination,"7 7 leaving them, as West puts it,
under the private sovereignty of men.7"
Ruth Gavison suggests that such feminist condemnation of privacy
''raises a substantive moral and political question" as to whether
women have "no interest in the values of privacy and intimacy," or in
79
keeping the state out of their lives in at least some circumstances.
It also highlights the need to sort out "dubious uses of the notion of
privacy" and to reject the invocation of the values of privacy to "mask
exploitation and abuse."'
My assumption is that the values of
privacy and intimacy and the principle of noninterference are vital,
however reconstructed by feminist critique. For example, Martha
Fineman argues that the concept of a space for families safe from
governmental intrusion, absent compelling reasons, is desirable, but
that defining the marital relationship and the heterosexual family as

the sacred core of privacy, as in Griswold, leaves family forms, such
as an unmarried mother and her children, vulnerable to state
intervention and scrutiny as "public" families.81 Other feminists
(particularly feminists of color) have noted the important role of the

76.

MACKINNON, supra note 66, at 193.

77. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1311; see also West, supra note 72, at 467-68
(calling for constitutional commitment to women's positive liberty).
78. West, supra note 72, at 455-56.
79. Gavison, supra note 64, at 22. Cf. Anne C. Dailey, ConstitutionalPrivacy and the Just
Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955 (1993) (arguing for model of constitutional privacy treating family
as important political, rather than purely private, institution and subjecting family to doctrine
of family justice).
80. Gavison, supra note 64. at 36. Allen reaches similar conclusions in her account. See
supra note 4.

81. Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23
CONN. L. REV. 955 (1991). For a fuller explication, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES

(1995). Feminist analyses of the history of welfare regulations and practices illustrate the idea
of the "public" family. See MIMI ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN 324-25

(1988) (describing such practices as "midnight raids" of homes of women receiving AFDC to
determine if there was a "man in the house" who would become "substitute father,"
disqualifying family from benefits). Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (upholding
home visitations to AFDC recipients pursuant to state statutory scheme as reasonable and not
violative of Fourth Amendment or unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 7:195

home and the "private" sphere as a site of refuge, particularly when
persons face discrimination and oppression outside the home. 2
As to Gavison's second point, we should ask whether and how legal

protection of privacy hinders women's inviolability by sustaining
dubious uses of the notion of privacy. Revisiting the relationship
between inviolability and privacy, I will use the trilogy of castle,
sanctuary, and body to illuminate how, historically, protecting certain
loci of inviolability has impaired the inviolability of women, as well as
how certain interpretations of inviolability must be rejected or must

yield to the inviolability of women's bodily integrity and decisional
autonomy.
B. Inviolability and Spousal Immunity

Let us return to the origins of the right of privacy. In their famous
article, "The Right To Privacy," Warren and Brandeis assumed that
tort law afforded the man in his castle adequate protection from
physical invasion.3 The Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railway
Co. v. Botsford spoke of a "sacred" common law right to control

one's person (in the case before it, that of a woman).' Yet at
common law, married women lacked inviolability because doctrines
of spousal immunity and of marital exemption from rape law rendered

them unprotected against physical assault by and forced sexual
relations with their husbands."

Indeed, under the law of coverture,

a married woman disappeared as a separate legal person, becoming

"one person in law," "incorporated and consolidated into that of the
Married women's lack of a separate legal identity was
husband."'

82. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Groundingthe Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1990) (describing private space in which lesbians are free from patriarchy);
Roberts, supra note 65, at 20-22 (describing home as "site of solace and resistance" for black
women); but see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (noting community
ethic against public intervention among people of color and function of home as a "safe haven
from the indignities of life in a racist society," while concluding that "but for this 'safe haven'
in many cases, women of color victimized by violence might otherwise seek help").
83. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 193-94.
84. 141 U.S. 250,251 (1891). Although feminists sometimes argue the right of privacy is too
disembodied, it is interesting to note that both Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), and an even earlier
precedent for the right of privacy involved female plaintiffs. See DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W.146
(Mich. 1881) (upholding action for invasion of privacy during "sacred" time of childbirth by
presence of stranger in plaintiffs home). Cf.Christine L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily
Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 327 (1991) (arguing for right of bodily integrity rather than
right of privacy and invoking Botsford in support).
85. See BALOS & FELLOWS, supra note 3, at 185-200. For a helpful and thorough discussion
of the history of interspousal tort immunity, as well as the extent to which it either survived or
was eroded in light of Married Women's Property Acts, see Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort
Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 86-129 for
discussion of the marital rape exemption.
86. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (1765). Here, being one flesh, or
one person, took on a legal significance imposing a series of "disabilities" on married women,
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used to justify husbands' administering physical chastisement to their
wives87 and the marital rape exemption (since a husband and wife
were one person (the husband), he could not rape himself).'
Perhaps the most egregious failure to recognize women's inviolability
was Lord Hale's often-repeated idea that because a woman consented

to matrimony, she gave her consent to sexual relations, and therefore
could not be raped.8 9 Such common law doctrines have had a
lingering impact on American law, as well as on American society.9°

Moreover, notwithstanding the formal passing away of such doctrines,
there survive some remnants of the idea that the law (and courts)
should not invade the privacy of the home or "go behind the curtain"
of domestic life. 9'
There can be little argument that legal doctrines like spousal
immunity and spousal unity, or coverture, manifest disregard for

women's bodily integrity and autonomy and, instead, sanction their
vulnerability in marriage.' The law's reluctance or refusal to intrude
into the private sphere of family life and the sanctity of the marital

relationship (as it were, the castle and the sanctuary) also played a
part in rationalizing immunity and constructing women's vulnerability. 93
In light of the history of disregarding the bodily integrity and
decisional autonomy of women within marriage, one might concur

not incurred by unmarried women, limiting freedom to contract, to own property, to engage in
professions, and the like. Id. at *430-32.
87. Id. at *432-33.
88. See Anne C. Dailey, Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1986).
89. Id. (citing 1 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S.Emlyn ed.,
1778)). For judicial criticism and rejection of this rationale, see infra text accompanying notes
115-17.
1 90. See Tobias, supra note 85 (discussing interspousal tort immunity); State v. Smith, 426
A.2d 38 (N.J. 1981) (noting influence of common law marital exemption from rape law in
American states but questioning existence and scope of such exemption).
91. Compare State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (Phil. Law 1868), reprintedin BALOS & FELLOWS,
supra note 3, at 196, 197, 199 (declining to recognize wife's claim for battery not because of
husband's "right to whip his wife" but because "[w]e will not inflict upon society the greater evil
of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence") with
Patternsof Abuse, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1994, at 26, 28 (linking ambivalence in American society
about family violence to Americans clinging to "'zone of privacy'-the unwritten code that a
man's home is his castle and what happens inside should stay there").
92. Additionally, prior to the abolition of slavery, African women held in slavery lacked
protection against violations of their bodily integrity and moral autonomy stemming from rape,
forced reproduction, and forced alienation of mothers from children; even after abolition,
African-American women were not afforded adequate legal protection against rape. Roberts,
supra note 65, at 7-10. Former slave Anna Julia Cooper told of the struggle of black women
"to keep hallowed their own persons" and, against "fearful and overwhelming odds, that often
ended in horrible death, to maintain and protect that which woman holds dearer than life."
THEIR WORDS, THEIR
BLACK WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LIFE:
THOUGHTS, THEIR FEELINGS 329 (Bert James Loewenberg & Ruth Bogin eds., 1976).
93. Tobias, supra note 85, at 394.
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with feminist critics of privacy that language about inviolability,
sanctity, and sanctuary rings hollow for women and that the realm of
the private is indeed a sanctuary for men from the normal operations
of law. There is a long history of feminist condemnation of the law's
complicity in maintaining gender inequality and thwarting women's
inviolability. Eighteenth-century American feminists included among
their grievances the laws of coverture, which, "to all intents and
In the
purposes," made the husband a woman's "master." '
nineteenth century, in The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill
condemned the "yoke tightly riveted on the necks" of women within
the institution of marriage, decrying women's lack of recourse against
their husbands for physical violence.95 Mill especially abhorred the
fact that the legal fiction of marital unity, or of being "one person,"
permitted men to force sexual relations upon their wives, thereby
subjecting them to "the lowest degradation of a human being. '
In criticizing the institution of marriage, and the license it afforded
men, nineteenth-century American feminists demanded a woman's
right to control her body and her sexual and reproductive life (what
feminist historians describe as the call for a "right to self-ownership
in marriage" and to "voluntary motherhood").' It is notable that
what women demanded as a "sacred" right was, in effect, inviolability:
control of intimate access, freedom from the sovereignty of another
(here compare the contemporary feminist complaint), and respect for
bodily integrity.98
Indeed, some nineteenth-century feministq
deployed the image of the female body as a temple, defiled by men's
forced sexual access, to condemn marriage as "legalized prostitution.",99

Yet, in significant part due to feminist challenges, modem courts
and legislatures have become more willing to "lift the curtain" on the
privacy of the home and marriage and to abandon common law
doctrines of unity and immunity for the sake of protecting women's

94. Declaration of Sentiments, in History of Women's Suffrage, in THE FEMINIST PAPERS 417
(Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973).
95. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869), in JOHN STUART MILL AND HARRIET
TAYLOR MILL, ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 137, 159-60 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970).
96. Id. at 159-60. Mill seemed to think that, while wives could not refuse consent to sexual
relations, slave women could. Id.
97. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 305 (1992); see also MARY LYNDON
SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 187-88 (1989)

(describing similar themes in British feminist campaigns). On voluntary motherhood, see Linda
Gordon, Why Nineteenth-Century Feminists Did Not Support 'Birth Control' and TwentiethCentury Feminists Do, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY (Barrie Thorne & Marilyn Yalom eds.,
1982).
98. See Siegel, supra note 97, at 305-08.
99. Id. at 308 n.188 (quoting from Marriage and Maternity, REVOLUTION, July 8, 1869, at 4).
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inviolability, individual autonomy, and the integrity of their
bodies."° Thus, the joint opinion for the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey stated that contemporary constitutional law
rejects common law notions of marriage such as the legal fiction of
marital unity, and held that "[w]omen do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry.'.' Casey also declared that
a state could not constitutionally require notice to a husband, let

alone require his consent, with respect to a wife's decision to
terminate a pregnancy, because a husband's "deep and proper
concern and interest" in her pregnancy and in the fetus does not
override a woman's right to bodily integrity or her privacy rights as
an individual to make decisions concerning reproduction, free from
abuses of governmental power." Finally, the Casey joint opinion
also lifted the veil by citing the alarming rates of violence against

women in order to indicate the burden that such a notice provision
would impose and to suggest that women have reasons to keep their
reproductive decisions private. 3
C. Conflicting Loci of Inviolability: Castle, Sanctuary, and
Women's Bodies

Undeniably, there is still much to be done to secure inviolability for
women, not merely by changing the law but also by changing law
enforcement practices and public attitudes,, so that what has been
accepted or even legitimated is seen as violative and wrong. In this
regard, a key premise of the recently enacted Violence Against
Women Act is that women are at particular risk for violence because
of their gender and that state laws and law enforcement practices are
inadequate."4 One prominent declared purpose of the Act is to
"forg[e] a consensus that society will no longer tolerate violence

against women."' 1 5 Let us, then, accept the illusion critique to the
100. Interspousal tort immunity has eroded over the last century to the point where a
"substantial majority" of states have abolished it. Tobias, supra note 85, at 435. On the partial
erosion of the marital rape exemption, see infra text accompanying notes 108-29.
101. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830-31 (1992).
102. Id. at 2830 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), and Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52. 69 (1976)).
103. Id. at 2826-28.
104. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. § 13931 (1994). See S. REP.
No. 138, 103d Congress, 1st Sess. 60-65 (1993), available on LEXIS, Committee Reports File.
The Act also affords a civil rights remedy for crimes of violence motivated by gender. 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (1994); see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 385 (noting that Congress
has found that crimes of violence motivated by gender constitute bias crimes in violation of
victim's right to be free from discrimination on basis of gender and that "State and Federal
criminal law do not adequately protect against the bias element of crimes of violence motivated
by gender").

105. S. REP. No. 138, supra note 104, at 65. The legislative history referred to the legacy of
societal acceptance of family violence, including the common law right of chastisement and the
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extent that it reveals the gap between the ideals of inviolability and
privacy and of women's social and legal status.

The more interesting question raised by the critique concerns the
affirmative potential of those ideals and whether or not the invocation

of such ideals hinders or helps women's status. It is striking that
campaigns to end domestic violence not only bring to public attention

the fact that the home is too often a dangerous place for women, but
also invoke the image of the sanctuary in support of the goal of
making the home a sanctuary for women and their families, a haven

free from violence. 1' 6 As this attempt to appropriate for women the
image of home as sanctuary suggests, the imagery of inviolability

familiar from privacy jurisprudence may serve goals helpful to women.
The inviolability of the person, or body, and of the personality are
preconditions for women's equal and autonomous citizenship. °7
To assess the illusion critique's claims about the harmful effects of
the right of privacy, I use the marital exemption from rape law as an
example. The exemption has been wholly eliminated in some states
by judicial or legislative action. It has been eliminated or eroded to
varying degrees in other states, leaving what some critics have called

a "marital rape allowance" so that married women (and, in some
cases, unmarried cohabitants) are not fully protected against rape and
sexual assault. '°8

Notions of the privacy of the home and the sanctity of marriage
may be one reason for the continuation of the marital rape exemption
or of an "allowance."'' "° Yet it is critical to note, notwithstanding

marital rape exemption. In support of the Act, sponsor Senator Joseph Biden stated, "I want
to raise the consciousness of this country that women's civil rights-their right to be left
alone-is in jeopardy." "Women's Lives Controlled by Fear," Congress Told in Look Into
Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at A13 (quoting Senator Biden).
106. At a benefit held at Fordham University on October 12, 1994, in conjunction with the
display of photographs from Donna Ferrato's book, Living With the Enemy (1991), activist and
actress Linda Lavin stated, "My hope for women is quite simple[:] ... that every woman's home
can be a haven, not a torture chamber." See supra text accompanying note 63. One part of the
Violence Against Women Act is entitled "Safe Homes for Women." 42 U.S.C.A. § 13951
(1994).
107. Cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991)
(arguing for affirmative conceptions of privacy encompassing ideas of liberty, equality, bodily
integrity, and autonomy). Equality arguments and appeals to equal citizenship have played an
important role in eroding common law doctrines like the marital rape exemption; however,
demands for equal protection are also demands for equal privacy and for the equal application
of the underlying principle of inviolability. See Robin West, Equality Theory, MaritalRape, and
the Promiseof the FourteenthAmendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 76-79 (1990) (calling for Married
Women's Privacy Act); cf Dailey, supra note 88, at 1265, 1266, 1273 (noting potential of privacy
arguments but arguing that group-based equality arguments are preferable).
108. See Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance,
72 N.C. L. REV. 261 (1993); see also Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists,
29 J. FAM. L. 559 (1991); Dailey, supra note 88.
109. Perhaps the clearest example is People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981), in
which Colorado's highest court held that the state's interest in family harmony afforded a
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the implications of some feminist critiques, that such privacy
precedents as Griswold v. Connecticut,t11 Eisenstadt v. Baird,11 '
and Roe v. Wade"' have served primarily to attack, not to defend,

immunity for rape and assault within marriage. West states, for
example, that such privacy cases as Roe and Griswold seem to
"bolster" an argument that "protection of marital privacy, insularity,
and harmony is such an important state interest that protection of the
husband against criminal charges of rape substantially furthers that
interest.""'
MacKinnon charges that the constitutional right of
privacy relied upon in Roe sanctions oppression of women in
private."' Neither West nor MacKinnon offers any examples, and
I have not found one, of cases in which a court cited Griswold,
Eisenstadt, or Roe to defend immunity for rape within marriage."'

To the contrary, in rejecting the marital exemption from rape law,
courts have stated that the right of privacy and the "sanctity of the
marital home" do not shield a husband either from liability for

violations of his wife's bodily integrity or from
state invasion of such
"sanctity" for the purposes of public safety. 16
In Pennsylvania v. Shoemaker, the court rejected a husband's

assertion that his right of privacy overrode any state interest in
enacting a Spousal Assault Statute:

The state has a compelling interest in protecting the fundamental
right of all individuals to control the integrity of his or her own
body. The right to privacy within the marital relationship is not
absolute and . . . must be balanced against [that state interest]
....
"To say that the right to choose one's marriage partner is

a fundamental right protected by the right of privacy is not to say
that marriage, once entered into, becomes a fortress impervious
to any legal action brought by one partner against the other.""..7

rational basis for the marital rape exemption. A number of states distinguish between cases in
which a couple lives together and those in which they have initiated a legal separation and/or
live apart-perhaps because they use the latter as a proxy for the end of marriage and marital
harmony. See Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 145 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
legislature intended to exclude rape achieved through intimidation from rape definition if
married couple was not "living separate and apart").
110. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
111. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. See West, supra note 107, at 67 & n.84.
114. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 62, 66-78.
115. For cases explicitly rejecting such a claim, see infra text accompanying notes 116-23.
The Colorado Supreme Court cited no privacy precedents to support its holding in People v.
Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981).
116. Pennsylvania v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
117. Id. at 594 (quoting Attorney General's brief).
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Thus, the court rejected an interpretation of home as castle or
marriage as sanctuary that would trump a woman's bodily integrity or
the inviolability of her body. The court went on to note that the
legislation itself signaled a rejection of the view of married women as
chattel of their husbands in favor of the right of a married woman to
be secure in her own home' 18 and, as a later court put it, a willingness to demystify the mantle of spousal immunities. 9
Similarly, in the often-cited case, People v. Liberta, New York's
highest court held that no rational basis existed upon which to
distinguish between rape committed outside of or within marriage and
concluded: "The right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent
sexual assaults."' 2 ° Rejecting the rationale most frequently proffered to account for the exemption, Lord Hale's statement that a
married woman gives irrevocable implied consent to sexual intercourse,12 1 the Court stated that "a marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity."'' 22 Equally critical of Hale's rationale, an Illinois court
stated that implied consent "depriv[es] women of their dignity by
refusing to recognize them as whole human beings who are entitled
1 23
to decide whether or when they will engage in sexual relations.
Not only have privacy rights failed as a defense of the marital rape
exemption, but federal and state privacy precedents concerning a
realm of bodily integrity and decisional autonomy for married and
unmarried women have justified eroding the exemption. In language
favorably echoed by other courts, the court in People v. DeStefano
spelled out the implication of precedents such as Griswold,Eisenstadt,
and Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth:24
The logical extension of these holdings is that if a wife may
unilaterally prevent or terminate a pregnancy does she not also
unilaterally possess a right to refuse the physical act which leads
to such pregnancy. While recognizing the sanctity of marriage
modern decisional law also recognizes that the right of a wife to
supremacy over her own body is paramount to her spouse's

118. Id.
119. Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 565 A.2d 782, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (Tamilia, J.
concurring).
120. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984). Accord Williams v. State, 494 So.
2d 819, 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986).
121. See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (NJ. 1981) (noting that Hale offered no authority
for this proposition and observing that "the martial exemption rule expressly adopted by many
of our sister states has its source in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago").
Ct. App. 1992).
122. 474 N.E.2d at 573. Accord People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ill.
123. People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 710, 711.
124. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating husband-consent requirement in abortion statute).
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desire. Indeed her rights to individual autonomy and to control
procreation are but a part of the more comprehensive right to
bodily integrity."
Here, like the Supreme Court's disaggregation of marriage into an
association of individuals with constitutional liberty in its step from
Griswold to Eisenstadt,'2 6 the DeStefano court reasoned that marital
sanctity and a husband's desire must yield to a woman's "supremacy"
over her own body, reflecting her right to bodily integrity.2 ' Thus,
while the illusion critique stresses that women's formal rights to
privacy mean little if women have less power than men in private,
courts interpret these rights as implying that women should not be
subject to abuses of power in private and be without legal protection
against such abuse, even if they are married to the person who would
exercise that power.
The judicial treatment of the conflict between the marital rape
exemption and a married woman's inviolability stresses the violation
of her rights to bodily integrity and autonomy (i.e., her right to
choose with whom and when to be sexually intimate)."2
The
erosion of the exemption signals that the "sacred" precincts of the
home and even the bedroom cannot provide complete immunity (for
men) from the law's reach. Moreover, it reflects a conclusion that the
inviolability of the marital relationship does not trump the inviolability and integrity of a woman's body and her personal
sovereignty over it. While feminist critiques of privacy predating the
125. People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513-14 (Sup. Ct. 1983). Accord Williams, 494
So. 2d at 827, 828 ("It would be ludicrous to hold that a marriage license implies consent to such
a gross violation of one's bodily integrity.").
126. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Some critics charge that here the Court made a fateful and
problematic turn from the "old" privacy of the home, the family, and marriage to privacy as an
individual autonomy right. See, e.g., Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration,
77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 525-29 (1989); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 56-57 (1991). Cf.
Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1519 (1994) (arguing that move toward envisioning family members as autonomous choosing
individuals brings freedom from ancient status hierarchy and simultaneously destroys anchors
that once secured responsible connection).
127. See also State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 46-47 (NJ. 1981) (rejecting defendant husband's
notice claim concerning liability for rape within marriage because, in light of such legal
developments as, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), which involved "the right of women to make their own choices regarding reproduction
and sexual conduct," "[n]o person in this State in 1975 could justifiably claim that a man had
a legal right to impose his sexual will forcefully and violently on a woman, even if it was his
wife, over her unmistakable objection.").
128. See Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 224 (Ga. 1985) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 599 (1977)). The same language appears in People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 575
(N.Y. 1984). The focus upon women's bodily integrity signals a rejection not only of implied
consent but also of another rationale offered for the exemption, that forcible sex within an
intimate relationship is a lesser injury than other kinds of rape. Susan Estrich argues that this
rationale illustrates, in an extreme form, the law's suspicion of women's allegations of rape in
instances not conforming to "real rape," or rape by a stranger. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE
72-76 (1987).
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partial erosion understandably highlighted the gap between privacy's
aims and women's lives and properly continue to address that gap, it
is striking that feminist critiques even today seem to suggest that
marital 129
privacy will inevitably trample women's inviolability and
privacy.

III.

ENVISIONING WOMEN'S INVIOLABILITY:

TOWARD A

FEMINIST ACCOUNT

In this section, I offer some thoughts about envisioning women's
inviolability. In doing so, I revisit some familiar feminist accounts
placing sexuality at the center of women's oppression and lack of
inviolability. Although an account of inviolability ultimately must
address more than sexuality, the problems of envisioning sexual
autonomy for women and of articulating appropriate boundaries
between consensual sex and rape or sexual assault receive considerable feminist attention and serve as a source of contentious
societal debate. 130 I highlight the themes of inviolability, sacredness,
and security in the discourse surrounding those issues, particularly on
the topic of the injury to women from rape and sexual assault.
Drawing on a range of sources, I develop the images of castle and
sanctuary (or temple) to characterize what seem to me to be two key
aspects of envisioning sexual autonomy: the legal protection of
women's rights to bodily integrity and autonomy against sexual assault
and invasion, and the articulation of possibilities of sexual
connection
131
compatible with women's inviolability and well-being.
A. Inviolability,Integrity, and Privacy: Sex and Violation
The value of the inviolability of the person and the personality
translates into the legal protection of the rights of bodily integrity and
autonomy, or moral independence, in decision making. Themes of
integrity and autonomy are also applicable to legal protection against
sexual assault. But some feminist analyses of sexuality seem to

129. See supra note 110-14 and accompanying text.
130. Some feminist legal theorists question whether the focus on sexuality obscures other
important sources of oppression and distorts feminist theorizing. See Mahoney, supra note 3,
at 222-31. This proposition was discussed at the annual Feminism and Legal Theory Summer
Conference held at Columbia University School of Law (June 6-8, 1994), convened by Martha
Fineman, "Direction and Distortion: The Centrality of Sexuality in Feminist Legal Theory." My
analysis in this section benefitted from my participation in that Conference.
131. I noted at the outset that I am using the images of castle and sanctuary or temple as
helpful heuristic or rhetorical devices for thinking about concepts like bodily integrity, decisional
autonomy, and sexual agency. I recognize that such images, as they have functioned in law, also
may have a constitutive significance, or what postmodernists would call a regulatory role, in
shaping a person's experience of body, home, privacy, and the like. See generally MICHEL
FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1990).
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suggest that attempting to distinguish sexual assault from consensual
sex fails to acknowledge the element of violation in all
heterosexuality, particularly sexual intercourse. What, exactly, is the
underlying model of bodily integrity and inviolability in such a
charge?
1.

Intercourse as Violation
The theme of violation features centrally in MacKinnon's account
of sex inequality and gender. Indeed, "woman" as a social construct
is defined by reference to the potential for violation: women's gender
identity is their sexuality, which is violable. Thus, women have no
privacy and are not inviolable.'32 MacKinnon's apparent equation
of heterosexuality with violation continues to receive considerable
attention within and outside of academic circles.'33
How, exactly, is sex violative of women? MacKinnon stresses that
gender is a social construction and disclaims biological determinism,
criticizing, for example, feminist accounts of rape that seem to hold
that men are natural predators and women their prey because of
"structural capacity" and "structural vulnerability."'"t
At the same
time, her central image of the way male domination shapes women's
lives is one of intrusion. She treats the male mind and the penis as
instruments of aggression and observes that the male model for
knowing (which, not coincidentally, invokes sexual metaphors) has
been characterized as penetration, invasion, and the violation of
boundaries."'35 Jeanne Schroeder charges that MacKinnon's account
of sexuality echoes medieval misogynistic stereotypes which equate

132. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 656-57; see supra text
accompanying notes 70-78.
133. I cannot offer a full account here of the many defenses and criticisms of MacKinnon's
analysis of sexuality within the literature of feminist jurisprudence, but they include charges that
her account assumes a uniform or essential female experience, privileges women's experiences
of violation and harm but not of pleasure and choice, and leaves no room for women's agency
and desire. For a sympathetic critique, see Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices,
24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990). For a critique from a nonlegal source that has received considerable
media coverage, see KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER:
CAMPUS 138-60 (1993).

SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON

134. MacKinnon, Toward FeministJurisprudence,supra note 2, at 636 n.3 ("Male is a social
and political concept, not a biological attribute."); Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to
Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 17 (1991) (quoting
and criticizing SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 4,6 (1976)). Notwithstanding her
critique of Brownmiller, MacKinnon's own account of the genesis of sex inequality-"on the first
day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by force"-invites the question of how
men's achievement of dominance over women was possible if not by some physical differential.
MACKINNON, supra note 114, at 40.
135. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,supra note 2, at 636-37 & n.4.
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women with their sexuality and which treat
sex as inherently
t3
degrading, defiling, and violating for women. 6
MacKinnon's co-author and collaborator-in antipornography efforts,
Andrea Dworkin, is less resistant to locating women's lack of
inviolability and consequent vulnerability to male dominance in
women's bodies themselves. In her book, Intercourse, Dworkin
maintains that, either by nature or divine design, women have a lesser
privacy, due to the physical design of their bodies and the existence
of intercourse. 137 Her case against intercourse is that it is the
combination of the configuration of women's bodies and the existence
of intercourse in a misogynistic society that denies women the
inviolability thought to be characteristic of human beings. She writes:
A human being has a body that is inviolate; and when it is
violated, it is abused. A woman has a body that is penetrated in
intercourse:
permeable, its corporeal solidness a lie...
Violation [a term used for penetration in the "discourse of male
truth"] is a synonym for intercourse. . . . She is human, of
course, 38
but by a standard that does not include physical
privacy.1
Thus, women lack privacy, with dire and intrinsic consequences for
integrity and sense of self:
There is never a real privacy of the body that can co-exist with
intercourse: with being entered....
She, a human being, is supposed to have a privacy that is
absolute; except that she, a woman, has a hole between her legs
that men can, must, do enter ....
The slit between her legs, so
simple, so hidden ... that slit which means entry into
her-intercourse-appears to be the key to women's lower
human status. By definition.. . she is intended to have a lesser
privacy, a lesser integrity of the body, a lesser sense of self...
[and] this lesser privacy, this lesser integrity [of the body], this
lesser self, establishes her lesser significance.... 3 9
How does intercourse damage a woman's self and integrity? To
have integrity is to be unimpaired, sound, and complete.".
On

136. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized" Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in
ContemporaryFeminist Jurisprudence,75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1189-1213 (1990).
137. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987). For MacKinnon's praise of Dworkin's
book, see MacKinnon, Reflections, supranote 2, at 1285. In elaborating her "connection thesis,"
Robin West uses some of the passages from Dworkin that I quote in text to argue that, for
radical feminists (the "unofficial" story about connection), intercourse is an invasive and
threatening form of connection. West, supra note 60, at 32-36.
138. DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 122. One might question whether Dworkin unintentionally assumes that the male body should be the model for humans.
139. Id. at 122-23.
140.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 628 (1987).
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Dworkin's account of the female body, its natural state is one of a
"lesser privacy." The desired state of the body, on her terms, is to be
inviolate and to have integrity, which means never entered, never
accessible. Here Dworkin seems to mean that the "inviolate" body
is the "intact" or untouched body.14 ' Like the violation of that
which is sacred, or set apart, any entry of a woman's body is a form
of profanation. Here the image of the sanctuary or temple comes to
mind.
Yet neither the body as temple nor the body as castle may fully
capture Dworkin's view of the female body. While both connote
inaccessibility or restricted access, in each instance some forms of
entry are not violative and may be permissible and appropriate. In
contrast to Dworkin, nineteenth-century feminists invoked the
imagery of temple and defilement to support a demand that women
control access, not to argue that there could never be sex without
violation.'4 2 On Dworkin's view, it would seem that consent is
beside the point (particularly since women collaborate in their own
diminution and loss of identity through intercourse), which is that a
body that can be entered is a body subject to violation and lacking in
integrity and privacy:
In the experience of intercourse, she loses the capacity for
integrity because her body-the basis of privacy and freedom in
the material world for all human beings-is entered and occupied; the boundaries of her physical body are-neutrally
speaking-violated. What is taken from her in that act is not
recoverable, and she spends her life-wanting, after all to have
something-pretending that pleasure is in being reduced through
intercourse to insignificance. . . . The transgression of [the]
boundaries [of her body] comes to signify a sexually charged
degradation into which she throws herself, having been told,
convinced, that identity, for a female, is there-somewhere
beyond privacy and self-respect.'4 3
There is much to ponder here. In an ironic parallel, art historian
and controversialist Camille Paglia, a vocal critic of Dworkin and
MacKinnon (from a self-identified feminist stance), uses strikingly
similar imagery of integrity, inviolability, and even sacredness to
suggest that rape reflects women's natural vulnerability and men's
natural inclination:
Woman's body is a secret, sacred space. It is a temenos.

141.

Cf AMERICAN HERITAGE, supra note 7, at 949 (including "intact" among definitions

of "inviolate").
142.
143.

...

See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 137-38 (emphasis added).
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Everything sacred and inviolable provokes profanation and
violation.... Rape is a mode of natural aggression that can be
controlled only by the social contract....

Feminism, arguing from the milder woman's view, completely
misses the blood-lust in rape, the joy of violation and destruction.
...
Women may be less prone to [fantasies of cruelty and
torture] because they physically lack the equipment for sexual
violence [and] do not know the temptation of forcibly invading
the sanctuary of another body.1"
Here, a woman's body is a temple, a sanctuary. Yet, for Paglia, the
sacred invites violation rather than veneration, and sex, at least for
men, is a form of violation and transgression of women's bodies.14 5
What is more, Paglia claims that the distinction between rape and
heterosexual intercourse is merely one of intensity, coming close to
suggesting that, for women, all sex is an assault on inviolability:
The latent metaphors of the body guarantee the survival of
rape, which is a development in degree of intensity alone of the
basic movements of sex. A girl's loss of virginity is always in
some sense a violation of sanctity, an invasion of her integrity
Sperm are
and identity. Defloration is destruction. ...
miniature assault troops, and the ovum is a solitary citadel that
Nature rewards energy and aggresmust be breached ...
sion.' 46
Here, the female body is not only temple but also castle; even a
woman's egg is a citadel inviting conquest by an aggressive sperm. 47
Moreover, as with Dworkin, intercourse impairs, indeed, violates
integrity: the destruction of the hymen of the intact, virginal body is

144. CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE 23-24 (1991). A "temenos" is "a piece of
ground surrounding or adjacent to a temple; a sacred enclosure or precinct." 17 OED, supra
note 6, at 743.
145. Cf LINDA GRANT, SEXING THE MILLENNIUM 17 (1994) (characterizing Paglia's view
of sex as violation and freedom for sake of rebellion as one strand in history of ideas about
sexual freedom). Paglia's theme of the inevitable relationship between the sacred and the
profane brings to mind the following verse (although I do not interpret it to be about rape):
'A woman can be proud and stiff
When on love intent;
But Love has pitched his mansion in
The place of excrement;
For nothing can be sole or whole
That has not been rent.'
WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Crazy Jane Talks With The Bishop, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
W.B. YEATS 255 (definitive ed., with author's final revisions, 1974).
146. PAGLIA, supra note 144, at 23-24. Paglia continues: "[N]ature creates by violence and
destruction. The commonest violence in the world is childbirth, with its appalling pain and
gore." Id. at 24.
147. Recent scientific studies challenge Paglia's model, or gender ideology, of active
sperm/passive egg. See William Booth, Human Egg Found Able to Signal Sperm, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 1991, at Al.
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but a symbol of the general invasion of integrity inherent in sex and
intensified in rape."
The accounts offered by Dworkin and Paglia regard intercourse or
the entry of a woman's body as inherently a violation of boundaries
and emphasize the dramatic impact on her identity of having the
status of one who can and will be entered/violated. Both authors
suggest a particularly male inclination to aggress and to violate, an
association also made by MacKinnon. For Dworkin and Paglia, the
spatial imagery of sanctity and violation also suggests that vulnerability to such violation is a unique, or at least, special risk for
women because men inevitably expect and will seek access to that
space, whether consensually or nonconsensually. Such determinism
seems to be a short step from ideas that men are not morally
responsible or accountable for sexual assault because they are
irresistibly driven to their actions.14 9
2.

The Physical and Social Construction of Violability

Like many feminists, I find Dworkin's and Paglia's, if not MacKinnon's, accounts problematic because they seem to eviscerate the
possibility of a woman's bodily integrity and inviolability coexistent
with sexuality and to treat as insignificant whether or not sexual
access to a woman's body follows from her exercise of control over
such access. 5 ' Accounts suggesting that women, by nature, have
transgressable boundaries such that any access is a form of violation
negate female agency and the significance of such goals as inviolability and control over access to one's person."5 l Feminists
attempting to secure legal protection of women from sexual violence
and to carve out a realm of meaningful sexual autonomy or agency
for women seek, on the one hand, to challenge entrenched stereotypes
of male aggression and female passivity and, on the other, to
acknowledge the extent to which such stereotypes reflect actual practices.152 In light of popular (mis)understandings of feminism as

148. Cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 134, at 354-55 (challenging model of "pain as
defloration" as exaggerated, linked to idea of women as property and symbolic value of hymen,
and describing women's reports of minimal discomfort at loss of virginity). See infra text
accompanying notes 198-211 (discussing concept of virginity).
149. See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 130-32 (1992)
(positing widespread cultural story that men "are not morally responsible for their heterosexual
conduct" and are "entitled to act on their sexual passions, which are viewed as difficult and
sometimes impossible to control").
150. Dworkin seems to say that if one had a world without misogyny, intercourse might not
be so devastating, but that it is highly unlikely that we could reach such a world. DWORKIN,
supra note 137, at 138-39.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70.
152. I have explored these issues elsewhere. See Linda C. McClain, Agency, Irresponsibility,
and Sexuality: Gender Ideology and Feminist Legal Theory (1994) (unpublished manuscript
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holding that "all heterosexual sex is rape," ' 3 feminist legal theorists
increasingly recognize the need to construct accounts of "good" sex
and of a sexuality compatible with authenticity and well-being, while
taking seriously the impact of the institution of what Adrienne Rich
calls "compulsory heterosexuality."'
MacKinnon, Dworkin, and Paglia all raise important questions
about women's relationship to privacy and inviolability, and the
respective roles of the physical configuration of women's bodies and
155
of the social construction of bodies, gender roles, and sexuality.
While I reject the strongest, most physiological reading of Dworkin's
analysis, I think it is important to take seriously the question of
whether or not having or being a body that can experience intercourse, pregnancy, childbirth, and thus, in a sense, be open, makes
156
inapt models of privacy allegedly premised on male experience.
Nonetheless, such claims seem to encompass both a literal
physiological point and a broader point about social expectations
concerning women's inviolability or lack of it.
The first point concerns whether or not an act like intercourse, or
the entry of a woman's body, is, "neutrally speaking" (as Dworkin
puts it), an invasion incompatible with an overall sense of privacy and
inviolability.157 Or, as other feminists suggest, can and do women
experience entry (or, to challenge gender role and subject/object assumptions, encirclement), 158 either in a heterosexual or lesbian
context, as pleasurable, desirable, intimate, intense, fulfilling, fun, and
the like, and not as harmful or as a threat to identity, integrity, and

presented at Feminism and Legal Theory Summer Conference held at Columbia University
School of Law, June 6-8, 1994, on file with author).
153. See NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE 122 (1993).
154. See Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality and Self. A PreliminaryInquiry Into the Politics
ofAuthenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217 (1988); Henderson, supra note 149, at 166; West, supra note
60. On compulsory heterosexuality as an institution, see Adrienne Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexualityand Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF DESIRE 177 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
155. For a postmodern perspective on the social construction of bodies, including their
materiality and boundaries, and the role of "sex" as a regulatory norm in that process, see
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993).
156. West argues that women are not separate selves because of their potential for physical
connection with others, a potential that contains the seeds for experiences of both intimacy and
invasion through, inter alia, intercourse and pregnancy. West, supra note 60, at 3, 14, 53.
157. DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 137-38. See, e.g., Sallie Tisdale, Private Matters, SAN.
FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 11, 1992, at 7 ("the most basic of sex acts, the act of reproduction, is an act
of invasion as much as love; intercourse opens the body, enters one's self, enters the place where
a woman lives"); Luce Irigiray, This Sex Which Is Not One, excerpted in NEW FRENCH
FEMINISMS 100 (Elaine Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron eds., 1981) (suggesting that
autoeroticism of two lips of woman's labia touching themselves "is interrupted by a violent
intrusion: the brutal spreading of those two lips by a violating penis"); see also BUTLER, supra
note 155, at 45-46 (characterizing Irigiray's theory as a "rigorously anti-penetrative eros").
158. Cf. Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn Suppression, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1097, 1192 & n.458 (1994) (noting absence of vocabulary for women to describe actively
"engulfing" men in genital sex, or other sexual activities and feelings).

1995]

McClain

privacy?' 59 Of course, we cannot really speak "neutrally" about sex,
and we should grant that society and its institutions importantly shape
the contours of sexuality. Particularly when male dominance and an
ongoing struggle for female self-determination have been features of
our society, an either/or response to these questions may ignore, on
the one hand, the constraining role of such factors as gender ideology,
sexual violence, and men's attitudes about women and sex, and, on

the other, the facilitating role of women's sense of physical security,
moral and sexual autonomy, and desire, as well as the reconstructive

imagination of women and men."w
The broader point about gender and inviolability is the claim that
the world creates women's boundaries, or the lack thereof, so that
women do not experience a strong sense of privacy because of the
risks posed to that privacy from outside, risks to bodily integrity as
well as to other aspects of identity.'61 MacKinnon's graphic claim
that women experience the world as "a fist in the face"' 62 has

echoes in feminist work about the many ways in which women are at
risk on the street, on the job, and at home for violation, intrusion, and
invasion through battering, rape, sexual harassment, street harassment,
sexual objectification, and role expectations about parenting. 63 This
empirical world intrudes upon such privacy values as solitude,
seclusion, bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and personhood. In
this regard, when some feminist legal theorists conclude that women
face privacy losses unique to their gender,"6 they are not attributing
those risks only or primarily to genital configuration, but to the social

159. See Henderson, supra note 149, at 164-66; see also Meyer, supra note 158, at 1150-55
(citing sources on range of women's sexual fantasies and experiences and discussing importance
of "freewheeling sex talk"). One source for responses to the question in the text is the literature
on women's fantasies and experiences, as well as their writings about sex, in both a heterosexual
and lesbian context. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 158; LONNIE BARBACH, PLEASURES: WOMEN
WRITE EROTICA (1984); EROTICA: WOMEN'S WRITINGS FROM SAPPHO To MARGARET
ATWOOD (Margaret Reynolds ed., 1990); NANCY FRIDAY, MY SECRET GARDEN (1973)
[hereinafter FRIDAY, GARDEN]; NANCY FRIDAY, WOMEN ON TOP (1991). See infra note 160
for additional sources.
160. See Tracy E. Higgins & Deborah L. Tolman, Feminism, Rape Law, and the Missing
Discourse of Desire, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW (Martha Fineman & Martha
McCluskey eds., forthcoming 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing for
feminist conception of women's sexuality that more fully accounts for threat of sexual violence
and for women's experiences of sexual desire). For two feminist collections exploring the issues
raised in the text under the rubric of "pleasure and danger," see PLEASURE AND DANGER
(Carol S. Vance ed., rev. ed. 1992); POWERS OF DESIRE (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
161. See ELLYN KASCHAK, ENGENDERED LIVES 131-47 (1992) (arguing that women's
experiences of boundaries are imposed upon them by men and that pervasiveness of invasion
and violation shapes women's perceptions of boundaries and risks).
162. MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1285.
163. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 4; Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the
Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1993); Mary Joe Frug, A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992).
164. ALLEN, supra note 4, at 123-35, 141-42.
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construction of what a "woman" is and expectations about women's
accessibility.

The interplay of body and society in shaping a woman's experience
and expectations of inviolability and privacy is a complex issue that
I cannot hope to develop fully here. Thus, while one might argue that
a clear gender difference, rooted in physiology, is that women and
men have different expectations of inviolability, such a conclusion
may ignore the impact upon such expectations of the social construction of "woman" and "man" by reference to their performing an
appropriate sexual role (being entered or penetrated versus entering
or penetrating) as well as to their potential for sexual violation. 6 5
This construction sets up heterosexual intercourse as the normal and

appropriate form of sex and ignores not only other forms of
heterosexual expression, but also the range of experiences in lesbian

sexuality"6 and male sexual desire to enter another man's body or
to be entered. 67 An attempt to envision inviolability and to
reconstruct sexuality should critically assess such construction, as well

as the implications of the use of the male-female relationship and
presumed sexual roles to describe situations of dominance and vicFinally, one may argue that the configurations of
timization.1' 6

165. Judith Butler uses the idea of "performativity" to explore the role of gender norms and
the potential to subvert them. See generally BUTLER, supra note 155: JUDITH BUTLER. GENDER
TROUBLE (1990). Even some accounts arguing that the anatomical construction of human
bodies contributes (perhaps) inevitably to an association of mastery and subordination with
penetration point to the exaggeration or exacerbation of such an association through fantasy and
misogyny. Leo Bersani, Is The Rectum A Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL
ACTIVISM 197, 216-17 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1st ed. 1988).
166. For lesbian feminist writings challenging the idea that gender-role exploration in lesbian
sexuality, including such acts as penetration, merely replicate-rather than challenge and subvert-heterosexual norms, see Amber Hollibaugh & Cherrie Moraga, What We're Rollin Around
in Bed With: Sexual Silences in Feminism, in POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 160, at 394-405;
Joan Nestle, The Fern Question, in PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 160, at 232-41.
167. Bersani, supra note 165, at 217-18 (arguing that phallocentrism, with its emphasis upon
mastery and penetration, also involves denial of "the perhaps equally strong appeal of
powerlessness, of the loss of control," and of disintegration of self associated with "subordinate"
role of woman or man in vaginal or anal intercourse); DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 148-61
(discussing impact of sodomy laws in constructing "nature"); see also Katharine Franke,
Cherchez La Femme: Law, Sexual Identity, and Desire (1994) (unpublished manuscript
presented at Feminism and Legal Theory Summer Conference held at Columbia University
School of Law, June 6-8, 1994, on file with author) (arguing that law constructs female and male,
and wife and husband, as opposite sexes with capacity and desire for intercourse with each
other). Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 122-23 (arguing that although men have bodily
openings, unlike women's genitals, they are not synonymous with entry). It is perhaps
illuminating to consider the extent to which men's assumptions about inviolability account for
homophobia. Bersani, supra note 165, at 221 (suggesting that misogynistic and homophobic
attitudes disguise "fearful male response to the seductiveness of the image of sexual
powerlessness").
168. Consider the deployment of the categories of "man" and "woman" to mark aggressor
and victim in the phenomenon of men raping men in prisons. Such rape is a practice
documented as widespread and inadequately prevented. Cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970
(1994) (interpreting "deliberate indifference" standard in context of Eighth Amendment claim
by prisoner, a preoperative transsexual who "projects feminine characteristics," based upon

1995]

McClain

229

female and male bodies need not lead inevitably to women's
vulnerability, but instead to women experiencing a strong sense of
privacy and interiority, and men, a sense of exposure and vulnerability. Indeed, it seems that men's greater expectation of
inviolability depends significantly upon social practices and reinforcement and that such expectations can be shaken, as the much

publicized case of Lorena Bobbitt and John Bobbitt suggests.1 69
3.

Securing the Inviolability of Body and Personality
In any event, whether or not physiological configurations, as well

as power differentials arising in part from gender roles, explain why
violation is possible, they need not dictate limits on the cultural or
legal recognition and protection of inviolability.17

If you will, law

and culture should protect both the literal frontier, the physical
boundaries of a woman's body, and the "inner citadel" of her

autonomy concerning the use of her body. For example, in her classic
work on rape, Susan Brownmiller hypothesized that "man's structural
capacity to rape and woman's corresponding structural vulnerability

placement among general prison population followed by rape by other prisoners). Men who are
raped by other men suffer "rape trauma" symptoms, arguably heightened because men "are
brought up to expect internal inviolability." Motion and Brief of STOP PRISONER RAPE,
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Appendix at i, Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970
(1994) (No. 92-7247). Accounts of why such assaults occur often speak of the need to create a
substitute for the "normal" world of heterosexuality (in the absence of available females), and
the need to express aggression and establish dominance over other men. The gender imagery
of such rape, as well as the typical characteristics of those targeted for rape, clearly mark the
aggressor as a "man" and the male who is victimized as a "woman," "gal-boy," or some other
appellation connoting femininity. See, e.g., id. at 1-10; Wilbert Rideau, The Sexual Jungle, in
WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS

73-107 (1992) (recounting personal observations and citing sources). Another example is other
forms of violence in predominantly male environments. See Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 5,1994, at 62, 70-81 (reporting use of terms "women," "pussy," "fucking
little girl" applied to freshmen subjected by upperclassmen to humiliation and physical abuse
at The Citadel and noting that construction of masculinity includes fear of homosexual desire
and "ruthless intimacy" counterbalancing physical abuse and affection).
169. Lorena Bobbitt was acquitted by reason of temporary insanity of cutting off her
husband's penis some time after he allegedly raped her and after a history of violence against
her. John Bobbitt was earlier acquitted of a charge of rape. Some women condemned Lorena
Bobbitt's action, while others condoned or supported it. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Feminism
Confronts Bobbittry, TIME, Jan. 24, 1994, at 74 (claiming that, in contrast to "feminist
intellectualdom," "the woman in the street is making V signs by raising two fingers and bringing
them together with a snipping motion" and concluding that "if a fellow insists on using his penis
as a weapon ...one way or another, he ought to be swiftly disarmed"). Perhaps indicating the
attention-grabbing effects upon men of the Bobbitt incident, an article in the men's magazine
Esquire about a supposed trend toward "do me" or sexual-agency feminism opened and
concluded with a concern for "sav[ing] the penis from the grassy field of American history."
Tad Friend, Yes, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1994, at 47, 48, 56.
170. The appeal to "nature" or anatomical differences may offer an explanation for how
rape is possible. For that matter, people are "naturally" capable of hitting and severely hurting
each other. But even a stance granting the relevance of "biology" or nature need not abandon
the attempt to protect, through criminal laws, nonconsensual physical contact. Indeed, it may
make such protection all the more important.

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 7:195

are as basic to the physiology of both our sexes as the primal act of
sex itself."17 ' At the same time, she called for a challenge to the
pervasive gender ideology of male dominance and aggression and of
a right of access to female bodies contributing to the incidence of
rape. 72 Brownmiller also believed that rape was distinguishable
from mutual consensual sex. Many contemporary feminists similarly
would insist that the law must give women adequate legal protection
against sexual assault and assume that one can draw lines between
mutual, consensual sex, and rape or
sexual assault, and acts which are
73
not equally violative of integrity.
What is perhaps most striking about the imagery that Dworkin and
Paglia use to describe the impact of intercourse, whether consensual
or not, upon women's sanctity and integrity is its parallel to the
imagery used in some rape cases to describe the consequences of rape
and sexual assault:
They [the victims] experience complete loss of control of the
body, complete loss of independence, and the removal of
something that is part of them. The inner space is intruded upon
and the most sacred and the most private repository of the self
has been violated. Forceful access has been into the innermost
source of the ego. Rape has been said to be the closest one can
come to destroying the ego except for murder ....
The
emotional consequences of sexual assault are acutely disabling
74
and chronically debilitating in many if not most victims.
Here, too, the image of the body as sanctuary or sacred space
explains the injury of sexual assault. The spatial image of the temple
or cloister, sanctuary or citadel, is literal: access is wrongfully gained
into a private, sacred "inner space." It is also metaphorical: that
"inner space" is identified with the location of personal identity, a
"private repository of the self' ("the envelope of the self") that has
been "violated." 175 Indeed, one familiar judicial characterization is

BROWNMILLER, supra note 134, at 4.
172. Id. at 325-48, 450-51.
173. My inclusion of the term "mutual" is meant to acknowledge that I leave unaddressed
considerable debate over what constitutes consent and what role the law should have in certain
gray areas. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control ofSexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988).
174. Mindt v. Shavers, 337 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Neb. 1983) (citing Hicks, Rape: Sexual Assault,
137(8) AM. J. OF OBSTET. & GYN. 931, 932-33 (1980)).
175. People v. Karsai, 182 Cal. Rptr. 406, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982). In her highly publicized
attack upon "rape hype," Katie Roiphe finds it alarming that women use the language of
violation and defilement to describe their reactions to date rape. For Roiphe, such imagery is
a throwback to ideas of female chastity and of women as vessels. ROIPHE, supra note 133, at
70-73.
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that "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self."' "'76
On such accounts, the injury to integrity inheres not only in the
physical invasion of the body but also in the disregard of the will.
While the will appears to make little difference to a woman's violation
for Dworkin, Paglia, and, to some extent, MacKinnon, I believe such

rape cases suggest, and many feminists argue, that its disregard is a
central part of the violation of sexual assault.

Thus. Brownmiller

defined rape as "[a] sexual invasion of the body by force, an incursion
into the private, personal inner space without consent ... [that]

constitutes a deliberate violation of emotional, physical and rational
integrity and is a hostile degrading act of violence .... "177
Judicial as well as feminist discussions of the wrong of sexual
assault link the violation of a woman's integrity to her body, as well
as her autonomy and privacy, and echo notions of bodily integrity and
(As
decisional autonomy familiar from privacy jurisprudence.'
noted in Part II, a central theme in the erosion of the marital rape
exemption is the repudiation of the notion of married women's

implied consent to sexual intercourse and the affirmation of women's
right to control access to their bodies."') For example, in State ex

rel. M.TS,'" the New Jersey Supreme Court summarizes feminist
work on the origin of rape law in the protection of male property
interests and on the need to redefine the crime to stress its assaultive
character. Rejecting an interpretation of "force" as requiring
anything more than what is necessary to complete the unlawful
penetration, the court stresses that the legislature had adopted the
concept of sexual assault as "a crime against the bodily integrity of

the victim.''.

The court refers to control over intimate access in

language reminiscent of constitutional privacy cases:

176. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (citations omitted). Many courts echo
Coker's formulation cited in the text as well as its statement that the crime of rape is "highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity
and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom
intimate relationships are to be established." Id.
177. BROWNMILLER, supra note 134, at 422. (By quoting Brownmiller, I do not mean to
take a conclusive stand on the rape-as-violence versus rape-as-sex debate.) In contrast to
Brownmiller's account of the injury of rape, Richard Posner analogizes rape to a property crime,
a theft of a woman's sexuality, motivated not by a man's hostility toward women or a desire for
domination but by the desire for sex. RICHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 182-83, 384-85
(1992). The strongly negative reaction of many female students in my feminist legal theory class
at Hofstra University to this and other commodity theories of rape supports my view that Posner
misses the full injury of rape.
178. People v. Lusk, 216 Cal. Rptr. 544, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("The law of rape
primarily guards the integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of
intercourse undertaken without her consent.").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
180. 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
181. Id. at 1277.
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Today the law of sexual assault is indispensable to the system of
legal rules that assures each of us the right to decide who may
touch our bodies, when, and under what circumstances. The
decision to engage in sexual relations with another person is one
of the most private and intimate decisions a person can make.
Each person has the right not only to decide whether to engage
in sexual conduct with another, but also to control the circumstances and character of that contact. No one ... has the
right or the privilege to force sexual contact. s2
A dual emphasis upon inviolability of body and will, person and
personality, is similarly present in a recent scholarly proposal for the
legal protection of sexual autonomy that dispenses with the force reStephen Schulhofer argues that such autonomy
quirement." 3
encompasses both moral or intellectual autonomy (the capacity to
choose), and physical autonomy (stemming from such core values as
bodily integrity and the importance of respect for one's physical
boundaries)."' Feminist reform proposals suggest that the question
of the precise scope of legal protection of such autonomy is complex,
and that for sexual autonomy to be meaningful and possible for
women, it is necessary to challenge not only a number of perceived
problems with the existing definitions of rape, force, and consent, but
also gender ideology about power, control, and responsibility. 85
B. Envisioning Women's Inviolability: The Body, the Castle, and
the Sanctuary
1.

The Female Body and the Castle

In privacy jurisprudence, we have seen the strong theme of the
home as castle, fortress, enclave, or sheltered place where the dweller
is free from invasion by the outside world. Similarly, the image of the
inner citadel as applied to persons signals the inviolability of heart,
mind, and autonomy. Motifs of a safe refuge and of defense against
assault, translated into the context of women's bodies and sexual
autonomy, evoke many associations.

182. Id. at 1278.
183. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11
LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992).
184. Id. at 70-71.
185. See Chamallas, supra note 173; Henderson, supra note 149. For an exchange raising
some of these issues, see Donald Dripps, Beyond Rape, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992); Robin
West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442
(1993); Donald Dripps, More On DistinguishingSex, Sexual Expropriation,and Sexual Assault:
A Reply To ProfessorWest, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 1460 (1993).
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The image of the castle and its common law roots may suggest a
hierarchical, patriarchal society in which women are under the
authority and protection of men. The sense of enclosure of a castle,
of a small society within, may also bring to mind married women's
lack of separate identity and status as well as their vulnerability to
sexual and other physical abuse at the hands of their husbands. In
Part II, I suggested that the recognition of women's legal rights of
privacy and inviolability has entailed a repudiation of notions of
spousal immunity and of the home as complete fortress shielded from
law. Moreover, there has been an effort to reclaim the image of
home as safe haven for women.
The image of the castle highlights certain problematic features of
gender ideology concerning sexuality. Linking a woman's body with
a castle suggests a stance of rebuffing or defending against intrusion
and conquest. As so many feminist and other cultural commentators
have noted, an underlying theme of gender ideology in our society is
that of male as sexual aggressor and female as naysayer or passive
object of male aggression. On the one hand, such an ideology holds
women responsible for defending the fort, maintaining barriers, and
preventing access. On the other hand, ideas such as "all's fair in love
and war" suggest that sexual interaction between women and men is
a form of warfare and that seduction and conquest are appropriate
male prerogatives."8 As we have seen, Paglia revels in the dramatic
language of assaulting the fortress to characterize the natural
dynamics of male and female sexuality. Variants of such ideas are a
representation, whether their use is
staple of artistic and cultural
187
ironic, playful, or sincere.
It may be useful to characterize a woman's body as a castle to
suggest a woman's entitlement to keep out unwanted outsiders (be
they strangers or "intimate" associates). I have suggested that the law
should protect, and culture should respect, women's physical and
moral boundaries. A central theme in the feminist accounts of
sexuality discussed above is that current social arrangements assume
male entitlement to sexual access to women. Thus, a critical feminist
goal is to end that system of entitlement and to protect women
against sexual intrusion (hence such phrases as "no more" and "out

186. But see Jane E. Larson, "Women UnderstandSo Little, They Call My Good Nature
'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 379 (1993) (seeking to
"redefine the boundaries of sexual coercion by reconceiving seduction as a viable tort").
187. Best-selling romance novels, particularly historical romance, play with such themes,
including the idea of the mutinous heart that betrays the fort from within. For a classic analysis
of such themes of sex as conquest or war in the work of famous male authors, see KATE
MILLETT, SEXUAL POLrrIcs (1970).
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now"). 88 Undeniably, this type of feminist analysis makes the
valuable point that such protection must be one key element in
constructing female sexual autonomy and securing inviolability.
Moreover, in linking women's lack of control or meaningful autonomy
with respect to the sexual use of their bodies to such problems as
unprotected intercourse, unwanted pregnancy, unplanned motherhood, and the incidence of abortion, 8 9 such an analysis highlights
sexual violation as a gateway to other risks to bodily and psychic
integrity and suggests the high stakes involved in changing assumptions of male entitlement while strengthening female agency and
responsibility."9
Nonetheless, the image of the castle may also highlight one
problematic implication of feminist accounts stressing the violative
nature of sexuality for women: that any act of intercourse is
tantamount to a violation of bodily integrity. A recurring feminist
concern about MacKinnon's work is its apparent lack of a constructive
account of female sexuality."' For instance, Drucilla Cornell finds
inadequate the image of the fortress in MacKinnon's analysis of
female sexuality:
Under [MacKinnon's] view of the individual or the subject, the
body becomes the barrier in which the self hides, and the
weapon-the phallus-,asserts itself against others. The feminine
self, as it is celebrated in myth and allegory, lives the body
differently. The body is not an erected barrier, but a position of
receptivity. To be accessible is to be open to the other. To shut
oneself off is loss of sexual pleasure .... If one views the body
in this way, then "to be fucked" is not the end of the world. The
endless erection of a barrier against "being fucked" is seen for
what it "is"-a defense mechanism
that creates a fort for the self
1 2
at the expense of jouissance
Cornell's advocacy of a position of openness is not inattentive to the
problems of sexual coercion and sexual assault;193 rather, she
suggests that the defensive posture of the fort is not adequate as a
model of sexuality. Her model of the feminine may not speak to all

188. MACKINNON, supra note 114, at 219.
189. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 2, at 1308-21.
190. I have begun to explore this issue in greater depth elsewhere, focusing on assumptions
about agency and responsibility. See McClain, supra note 152.
191. For a sympathetic critique along these lines, see Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence
and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University, 103 YALE LJ.1533 (1994).
192. Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 644, 691 (1990). Cf.Bersani, supra note 165, at 222 ("Male homosexuality
advertises the risk of the sexual itself as the risk of self-dismissal, of losing sight of the self, and
in so doing it proposes and dangerously represents jouissance as a mode of ascesis.").
193. Cornell, supra note 192, at 692-94.
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women's experiences or ideals, but the openness she describes need
not be read as only physical or heterosexual-it suggests a receptivity
to connection with other persons and their bodies."9 One reading
of the image of body as castle is that viewing oneself as a castle or
fortress and being vigilant about barriers serves defensive purposes
and fosters solitude, self-sufficiency, independence, and distance from
others.195 Such a stance has its merits as well as its limits and costs
(as Cornell suggests). The image of the temple or sanctuary may add
another important dimension to the account.
2.

The Female Body and the Sanctuary

In attempting to envision women's inviolability, the image of the
body as sanctuary, or even temple, may be useful. In privacy jurisprudence, the sanctuary, like the castle, simultaneously connotes
restricted access, sacredness, and sanctity. What takes place within a
temple may be sacred, something set apart. The image of a temple
may suggest a linking of secrecy, seclusion, and solitude with
sacredness-an inner sanctum or space for one's life, whether alone
or in relations with others. It may also connote the inner sanctum or
sanctuary within a person and suggest intimacy as a significant part of
human experience and embodiment. Griswold's characterization of
marital privacy stressed the "sacred precincts" of the bedroom along
with the "intimate" and "sacred" character of marriage. 196 Here,
there is a temple-like quality to the body and to the interactions of
bodies, as well as to the space in which sexual intimacy occurs. The
very association of temple or sanctuary with sanctity and privacy
illuminates the injury of "forced" intimacy as a violation of self. The
descriptions above of the injury done to the body by sexual assault
referred to wrongful access to a private, sacred, inner space, both a
literal inner space and a metaphorical one as the repository of the
self
While Dworkin and Paglia suggest that intercourse impairs
integrity, a feminist ideal of inviolability should embrace a broader
idea of integrity stressing choice about the use of one's body. Such
an ideal should suggest that the sanctity of the body does not require
complete rejection of any intimate connection, but insist upon the

194. Thus, one example Cornell offers of a metaphor of such openness is Luce
vision of a sexual encounter between two women, painting a picture of intermingling
and a lack of boundaries. Id. at 694 (quoting LUCE IRIGIRAY, When Our Lips Speak
in THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE 205 (Catharine Porter trans., 1985)).
195. For a literary expression of this self-conception, where the writer/heroine
concern with self-possession and autonomy to the themes of "Thresholds.
Fortresses.," see A.S. BYATr, POSSESSION 549-50 (1990).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.

Irigaray's
of bodies
Together,
links her
Bastions.
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significance of choice. In doing so, it would reject 197an equation of
abuse of a woman's body with intimacy and privacy.
As with the castle, one possible interpretation of the image of the
sanctuary is that inviolability requires complete inaccessibility. Such
an image has many associations, some constraining, some empowering, and some evocative of the accounts of Dworkin and Paglia.

Consider the symbolism of the virgin body as a temple. In the early
Christian tradition, women who embraced virginity and celibacy for
religious purposes served as symbols of integrity, intactness, and inviolability.1 98 Treatises on virginity contrasted such bodily integrity
with the dangers and pains placed upon the bodies of fertile married

women. 199

Moreover, in an age of religious persecution, the in-

tegrity of the virgin body served as a symbol of triumph over the
violation and invasion of the flesh imposed by torture and death. The
untouched virgin body also signified the perfect original state of the
body in the Garden of Eden prior to the expulsion: virginal, not

Such a repudiation of what appeared to be
sexual.2°
"natural"-sexual intercourse and procreation-evokes the utopian
themes of Dworkin's critique of intercourse as neither necessary nor
compatible with freedom. 20 ' Finally, the virgin body was a temple,

a symbol of the Church and of the Christian city," as well as an
unbreakable "invisible frontier" ;203 it was an enclosed, royal palace
hall in which the emperor (God) dwelled. 2° Indeed, as a locus for
the divine, both female and male celibate bodies were permeable to,
and vehicles for, divine indwelling and possession, expressed in

marital images of bonding and maternal images of nurture.2 5
Virginity and celibacy may also symbolize agency, self-sufficiency,
and a conscious choice of an identity not dependent upon sexual

affiliation .2 °'
197.

As historians of women's spirituality point out,

INNESS, supra note 19, at 88-90. 108-11.

198. PETER BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN, AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY 158-59, 186-87, 258-71. 383 (1988).

199. Id. at 25.
200. Id. at 186-87. 194. 351.
201. DWORKIN, supra note 137, at 138-39.
202. BROWN, supra note 198. at 271, 355-56, 362-63.
203. Id. at 354-56.
204. Id. Espousal to Jesus rendered virgin women sacred and unavailable to any other
marriage partner. Id. at 274.
205. Id. at 67-77, 91-92. In a striking appropriation of female fertility, celebrations of the
female virgin body spoke of the fertile, creative powers of the virgin. Id. at 363, 437.
206. Cf. MARILYN FRYE, Willful Virgin or Do You Have to be a Lesbian to be a Feminist?,
in WILLFUL VIRGIN 133 (1992) ("The word 'virgin' did not originally mean a woman whose
vagina was untouched by any penis, but a free woman, one not betrothed, not married, not
bound to, not possessed by any man. It meant a female who is sexually and hence socially her
own person."). In her critique of Radin, Schroeder associates the virgin female body with being
self-contained, complete, and untouched (or undefiled by the market). See generally Schroeder,
supra note 27.
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choosing religious celibacy afforded women independence, power, and
status in a male-dominated religious order, and freedom from
marriage and the potentially life-threatening dangers and pains of
Similarly, one feminist interpretation of the
motherhood. 7
archetype of the virgin goddess is of intactness, independence, and
inaccessibility, an archetype that "enables a woman to feel whole
without a man.''20 8 Some contemporary feminists who call for the
recognition of celibacy as a legitimate life choice, not a lack of
sexuality, also stress themes of autonomy, personal independence, and
political empowerment.2 '° Martha Fineman challenges the central
role of sexuality in personal identity, in definitions of family and
privacy, as well as in feminist legal theory.210 The sanctuary or
temple, thus, may support a range of associations including celibacy,
solitude, self-sufficiency, and power.2 1'
I would also like to use the images of sanctuary and temple to
speak about sexuality because of the temple's religious connotations
of sacredness and sanctity, human ambivalence about approaching the
sacred, and the temple's mediating role as a threshold between
realms.2 12
What is the connection between "man's spiritual
nature 21 3 and women's sexuality? As Griswold suggests, cultural

notions of intimacy suggest recognition of a sacred dimension to
sexuality, at least within marriage. There is certainly a rich history of
associations between human sexuality and the sacred, including the
metaphorical use of sexual imagery to describe spiritual experiences
and to envision the divine-human relationship. Such associations may
be found within the mystical traditions of Judaism and Chris-

207. See BROWN, supra note 198, at 259-83; CAROLINE WALKER BYNUM, HOLY FEAST AND
HOLY FAST 226 (1988); MEDIEVAL WOMEN'S VISIONARY LITERATURE (Elizabeth Elvilda
Petroff ed., 1986). But see BROWN. supra note 198, at 260 (noting that female children given
over by parents to be sacred vessels were seldom free agents).
208. JEAN SHINODA BOLEN, GODDESSES IN EVERYWOMAN 49, 69 (1985) (discussing
goddess Artemis); see also Christine Downing, Artemis, in WEAVING THE VISIONS: NEW
PATTERNS IN FEMINIST SPIRITUALITY (Judith Plaskow & Carol P. Christ eds., 1989) [hereinafter
WEAVING].

209. Wendy Kaminer, No Sex Is Good Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994, § 7 (Book Review),
at 18 (reviewing SALLY CLINE, WOMEN, PASSION & CELIBACY (1994)). For an argument that
the law and cultural norms should leave room for celibacy as a positive preference, not simply
as failed heterosexuality or repressed homosexuality, see Mary Anne Case, Is "None of the
Above" a Deviant Sexual Preference? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
210. See also FINEMAN, supra note 81.
211. Consider the reported trend of virginity as a defiant "counterculture" among teenagers.
DeNeen L. Brown, Virginity Is New Counterculture Among Some Teens, WASH. POST., Nov. 21,
1993, at Al.
212. See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, PATTERNS IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION (Rosemary
Sheed trans., 1974) [hereinafter ELIADE, PATTERNS]; MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE
PROFANE (Willard R. Trask trans., 1959).
213. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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tianity,214 as well as in many other ancient and contemporary
religious traditions."1 5 At the same time, one can also identify
cultural notions of the sexual as carnal, base, and degrading and as
the antithesis of the spiritual.
Much feminist work, particularly in the area of religion and
spirituality, charges that Western tradition includes a mind-body
dualism identifying men with and privileging spirit, mind, and reason,
and identifying women with, and thus devaluing, flesh, body, and
passion."6 Such work calls for a view of embodiment that values
the body as more than merely a vessel in which the exalted mind
dwells and that views sexuality as having a spiritual component or
sacred dimension. Audre Lorde called for a bridge between the
spiritual and the erotic, describing "the erotic" as a source of power,
and spiritual plane," and decrying the
lying on a "deeply female
2 17
denigration of the erotic.
Contemporary exploration by women of goddess (or Goddess)
imagery and worship, within and outside of Western traditions, also
involves legitimizing female power and the sacredness of the female
body.2 18 It is striking to note the vigorous controversy and charges

214. In the Christian tradition, one finds both female and male religious figures using sexual
imagery to characterize mystical union with "the Beloved." See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 198,
at 66-77, 91-92; MEDIEVAL WOMEN'S VISONARY LITERATURE, supra note 207. Within the
branch of Jewish mysticism known as Kabbalah, there is a notion of various aspects ("sefirot")
of G-d emanating from G-d, which are characterized as male or female, and of a sacred sexual
union between certain of those aspects. See GERSHOM SCHOLEM, ON THE KABBALAH AND ITS
SYMBOLISM (Ralph Manheim trans., 1969); SAFED SPIRITUALITY (Lawrence Fine trans. and
intro., 1984). One particular branch of such mysticism stresses the redemptive significance of
the traditional emphasis of having marital intercourse on the Sabbath, for such a union is
thought to represent and facilitate the union between the aspects of G-d known as the King and
the Shekhinah. Id. at 33-34.
215. See, e.g., MIRANDA SHAW, PASSIONATE ENLIGHTENMENT: WOMEN IN TANTRIC
BUDDHISM (1994). For a nonacademic anthology of erotic spiritual writings from many religious
traditions, see ROBERT BATES, SACRED SEX (1993) (book cover states that "[a]ll the writings
celebrate the human body as a temple of the divine"). In ancient Near Eastern religious
traditions, there was the institution of the "sacred marriage" between a deity (particularly,
Innana or Ishtar) and a ruler (some scholars see the biblical Song of Songs as a reflection of that
tradition). Also, temples were regarded as the homes of particular deities and in the temples
resided the "spouse" of the deity, humanly represented by a priest or priestess. Writing of a
later period, Herodotus describes the temple of Zeus Belus, at the top of which there was a
great bed, and in which no human save for one woman "whom the god has chosen out of all"
spent the night. HERODOTUS. THE HISTORY 1.181 at 115 (David Grene trans., 1987). The
misnomer "sacred prostitute" or "temple prostitute" also relates to the ritual significance of
certain sexual activity associated with temples.
216. WEAVING, supra note 208; WOMANSPIRIT RISING (Carol P. Christ & Judith Plaskow
eds., 1979) [hereinafter WOMANSPIRIT].
217. Lorde, The Uses of the Erotic, in LORDE, supra note 4, at 53.
218. See, e.g., Carol Christ, Why Women Need the Goddess, in WOMANSPIRIT, supra note
216, at 273, 277 (suggesting that "simplest and most basic meaning of the symbol of Goddess is
the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of female power as a beneficent and independent
power"); Don Lattin, Christian Doubters Call Sophia a Pagan Goddess, SAN. FRAN. CHRON.,
Mar. 5, 1994, at Al, A8 (describing interest by Christian feminists in Sophia, spirit of wisdom,
as "primordial source of female power").
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of paganism and heresy surrounding the recent efforts of a group of
Protestant women to re-imagine spirituality.219 One reported chant
to Sophia, embodiment of divine wisdom, offers a vivid image of
embodiment and of openness and agency: "'Our maker Sophia, we
are women in your image. ...

With the hot blood of our wombs we

give form to new life.... With nectar between our thighs we invite
a lover.... [W]ith our warm body fluids we remind the world of its
pleasures and sensations."'"2 Here, the physical processes of the
female body actively create, invite, remind. Other feminist efforts to
envision embodiment and the sexual, including motherhood and
generativity, as sacred similarly speak of a woman's "willingness to
surrender and to be opened by rhythms of nature flowing through
her" and of her body as a gate or an opening to the sacred."2
These attempts to find positive ways to envision sacredness, openness,
and choice in the areas of sexuality and motherhood touch upon
aspects of women's lives in which, even in the best of circumstances,
they may not be in full control, and may in other circumstances face
frightening vulnerability.222 Similar to Cornell's idea of the
feminine, these are attempts to conceive of the self as not completely
threatened by the crossing of boundaries.
At the same time, the image of the temple or sanctuary may also
suggest an enclosed and safe space within which to experience and
explore one's sexuality, a sexuality that may or may not involve other
persons. Instead of inviting defilement, as Paglia suggests, such an
image may elicit reverence or respect, even an attitude that
The imagery of
unauthorized entry is taboo and dangerous.'
sacred space may reflect a conscious religious invocation or it may
simply signal importance or value. For example, in her book Sex,

219. See Bill Broadway, "Re-Imagining"Foments UproarAmong Presbyterians,WASH. POST,
June 4, 1994, at C7; Peter Steinfels, Presbyterians Try to Resolve Long Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1994, at A24.
220. Lattin, supra note 218, at A8.
221. SHERRY RUTH ANDERSON & PATRICIA HOPKINS, THE FEMININE FACE OF GOD: THE
UNFOLDING OF THE SACRED IN WOMEN 73 (1992). Cf. BROWN, supra note 198, at 153, 154
(discussing Tertullian's description of Eve (and woman) as "the Devil's gateway").
222. See BYNUM, supra note 207, at 301 (arguing that we need new positive symbols for
generativity and suffering and that the female body offers positive, complex, resonant symbols
of love and generosity). On women's experiences of pregnancy, particularly unwanted
pregnancy, and motherhood, as invasive and threatening, see Twiss Butler, Abortion Law:
"Unique Problemfor Women" or Sex Discrimination?,4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 139 (1991);
West, supra note 60, at 29-32 (giving examples); see also Cornell, supra note 192 (characterizing
risks of pregnancy to individuation and bodily integrity and describing physical and psychic pain
of self-abortion); Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose
Abortion Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS 159
(Susan Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994) (analyzing treatment of women's
experiences of sex, pregnancy, and abortion by Feminists for Life of America).
223. See ELIADE, PATTERNS, supra note 212, at 15, 371, 384.
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Madonna invokes the image of a temple to describe her own
genitals. 224 Another pervasive image (also used to characterize the
virgin female body) is of a sacred or secret garden. 25 Such images
may touch upon feelings of interiority and
the desire for solitude,
226
secrecy, inaccessibility, safety, and privacy.

Some skeptics may voice concern that the image of a sanctuary or
temple is too inert, since a temple does not move or act and that to

compare women with an enclosed building does not sound themes of
agency and autonomy. The temple may be physically inert, but it is
internally dynamic or full of activity.2 27 Another problem with the

metaphor of body as temple is that it may echo too closely notions
that the female body is a place of sanctuary or refuge for others

(noting the common theme of men seeking to return to the womb
through intercourse). Like Katie Roiphe, some may fear the gender
ideology seemingly underlying the language of purity and defilement,
of sanctity and violation, although my own view is that those terms

could be deployed without regressive meanings in order to encourage
strong taboos against inappropriate access.
Obviously, both castle and sanctuary have their limits as images.
I have not attempted to offer a complete account of inviolability or

to prescribe new models for bodily integrity and sexual autonomy.
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to think about the possible meanings
of such images. To be sure, feminist models of sexuality require more
than a conception of inviolability, but inviolability is a necessary
component, and the language of protection, integrity, and boundaries
is crucial. The language of inviolability and inaccessibility may not
say enough about agency, desiring, acting as subject, and seeking out
other bodies. As with the language of privacy, the vocabulary of the

inward-looking dimension of personhood may exceed the outwardlooking or social dimension.22 8

224. MADONNA, SEX (1992) ("My pussy is the temple of learning."). Madonna's explanation
of the image of temple suggests that, for her, it is multivalent, reflecting the risks and rewards
of a female body: "I love my pussy, it is the complete summation of my life. It's the place
where all the most painful things have happened. But it has given me indescribable pleasure."
Id.
225. See, e.g., ANDERSON & HOPKINS, supra note 221 (using imagery of sacred garden as
metaphor for woman's spirituality and embodiment of sacred); FRIDAY, GARDEN, supra note
159: LUCE IRIGIRAY, AN ETHICS OF SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 185-217 (Carolyn Burke & Gillian
C. Gill trans., 1993) (using imagery of threshold and garden); Song of Songs 4:16 ("Let my
beloved come to his garden, and eat its choicest fruits."). The reference in the Song of Songs
to the female lover's sister as a "garden enclosed" (4:12) came to symbolize especially the Virgin
Mary but more broadly female virginity. BROWN, supra note 198, at 343.
226. See Tisdale, supra note 157, at 7 (suggesting that women have strongly developed sense
of territory and associate privacy with safety).
227. I thank Mary Anne Case for this formulation.
228. Cf. GLENDON, supra note 126, at 47-75; TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 15-1, 15-21.
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CONCLUSION

I have argued that inviolability is a core, even sacred, value in law
and jurisprudence. I have focused upon privacy jurisprudence and
used the trilogy of castle, sanctuary, and body to illustrate the idea
and imagery of inviolability. I have used these images to suggest that
protecting one location of inviolability, for example, the home as
castle, may have to yield to protecting another, a woman's body. The
themes of bodily integrity and decisional autonomy, or the integrity
of a woman's body and will, resonate in the repudiation of notions of
privacy threatening to women's inviolability.
I have also drawn upon the trilogy of castle, sanctuary, and body
for the purpose of envisioning a feminist account of inviolability. In
contrast to some feminist accounts of sexuality questioning the
coexistence of inviolability and sexuality, I have attempted to
elaborate the images of body as castle and as temple to suggest ways
to talk about inviolability, inaccessibility, and intimacy. The goal of
restricting access is also about power, the power to control one's
body-not only a core premise of the legal notion of inviolability, but
also a core feminist goal. 29 Feminist charges that inviolability is
illusory for women and that privacy sanctions the violation of women
by men offer reasons to look closely at the history and rhetoric of
privacy, but such charges do not persuasively argue for abandoning
either inviolability or privacy as a goal for women. To the contrary,
rights of bodily integrity and decisional autonomy linked to inviolability are critical for women as well as men. Inviolability and
privacy are not the only important values or even sufficient for a good
life. Yet the supposed debate between "power feminism" and (socalled) "victim feminism" involves finding ways to envision and
achieve female agency and power. 230 Like feminist critiques of
privacy, such debates illuminate the importance of autonomy for
women and the critical significance of women's control both of access
to their bodies and of decisions concerning their intimacy.

229.
230.

Cf. ALLEN, supra note 4 (advancing restricted access model of privacy for women).
See WOLF, supra note 153; McClain, supra note 152. For an insightful critique of Wolf

and of internal feminist debates, see

BELL HOOKS, OUTLAW CULTURE

(1994).

